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 Occasional Paper: May 30, 2000 |
| RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS UNDER PRESIDENT V.PUTIN
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Many Ukrainian and foreign experts
think that the new Russian president is notable for his pragmatism that will
certainly be reflected in a new Russian foreign policy. In reality, one may say
that V.Putin is more rational and even-tempered compared to emotional and
unpredictable B.Yeltsin only as regards the methods and techniques of
implementation of political decisions. The decisions per se are generally based
on the same mythological foundations, which compel the Russians to seek
restoration of their empire. V.Putins pragmatism means tougher upholding the
interests of the socio-political elite of the Russian society, the interests of
oligarchic clans, military and coercive structures, that in the aggregate are
depicted as Russias national interests.
Speaking
about the profound pragmatism relating to the real interests of the Russian
people achieving high living standards through modernization of the economy,
carrying out democratic reforms, involving into global processes, ensuring
stability and security through developing equitable relations with other
nations, etc. contrary to it is Moscows policy in Chechnya, infringement of
freedom of speech and other civil rights, increasing a coercive component in
all spheres of social life, etc. Liberal ideas recognized in the whole world
are perceived as declarations and rhetoric by the present-day Russian society,
which considers the modern world to be based on confrontation and cult of
brutal and tough force as the only means to ensure order.
Following
V.Putins inauguration, significant changes have taken place in the Russian
system of executive decision-making, characterized by the increased influence
of the Security Council of the Russian Federation upon development of domestic
and foreign policy. The formation of 7 federal districts has a clear coercive
coloration. At the same time, there is increased Moscows activity in the CIS
area.
During
May, the Russian officials visited Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries
(the presidential visit to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the visits of S.Ivanov,
Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister
I.Ivanov, Minister for CIS L.Drachevskiy, CIS Executive Secretary Yu..Yarov).
The common objective is to determine new ways of expediting the military and
political and economic integration in the post-soviet area under Moscows
domination. The major means is making use of weakness in positions of the CIS
countries to get their consent for further formalization of the CIS structures
and strengthening of the coercive component within that system.
A series of multilateral and bilateral interstate activities were held in Minsk
and Moscow at the end of May: a meeting of the Customs Union member-states at
the level of Head of Governments, a session of the Collective Security Council
of the parties to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), a regular session of
the CIS Economic Council. In addition, there were numerous bilateral consultations
and measures held in the framework of establishing a Union state. The most
important is (a) a decision concerning the transformation of the CIS Customs
Union into a full-fledged regional international organization, and (b) signing
the new Treaty on Collective Security of the CIS Countries. Besides, at the
session of the CST member-states, the
Collective Security Council foreign and defense ministers approved the package
of nine documents concerning the Treatys adaptation to the new geopolitical conditions,
as well as the memorandum as regards raising the Treatys effectiveness under
extraordinary insecurity pertaining to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and developing new types of armaments, spreading of illegal
trafficking in arms and drugs, international terrorism and extremism. The
memorandum specifies how, where and by what means the states will protect one
another. Among other issues of the agenda there was a discussion of the draft
basic guidelines of the member-states coalition strategy. The ministers
approved the draft provisions on the procedure of collective decision-making as
regards the use of force and means of the collective security system, and
implementation of such decisions, as well as on the model of a regional system
of collective security.
The final statement of presidents of the six states parties to CST specifies that military and
political relationship between the CST countries is a priority. The main
objective of CST is creating a geopolitical center of gravity in Eurasia under
the aegis of Moscow. Therefore, there is a change of the Kremlins priorities
as regards the pivot of integration in the CIS framework. The CST and Customs
Union have become a new pivot instead of the Union state of Belarus and the Russian
Federation, and the outlines of their activities may become identical already
in the near future. Armenia is the only country among the parties to CST that
does not belong to the Customs Union (the latter includes the Russian
Federation, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). Such an
integrated structure may significantly change the geopolitical situation in the
region very quickly, that makes the problem of self-determination more critical
for Ukraine.
The
model of the different-speed integration adopted by the Russian
leadership envisages simultaneous advancement in several major directions that
can be outlined according to their priority for Moscow:
- military and political integration in the framework of the
Collective Security Treaty;
- development of economic cooperation in the framework of the
Customs Union;
- strengthening the Union of Belarus and the Russian
Federation towards complete interstate unification and attraction of new
members to the Union;
- enhancing political, economic, informational, and cultural
influences of Moscow in the rest of the CIS countries that conduct more or less
independent policy, and counteraction to ingression of external influences in
that area.
The Russian Federation strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine. It is clear that for
Russia it will be easier to impose its will on the national periphery if the
post-soviet states accede to CST and the Customs Union. The issue of involving
Ukraine into these structures is a priority for Moscow. Therefore, it will be incited
from every corner not only by the Russian leadership, but also by certain
political forces in Ukraine. The statements by A.Lukashenko and G.Seleznyov
that Ukraine will allegedly accede to the Union state in the near future are
indicative, and they demonstrate Moscows covert (meanwhile) activity to that
end.
The main factor of
Moscows pressure nowadays is still the Russian energy, resources and
transportation monopoly that provides essential opportunities for the policy of
economic pressure on CIS states if they disagree with Russias dictates. The
policy in the field of energy supplies continues to be the most effective means
of the Russian influence on Ukraines positions in conditions of Ukraines
dependence on the supply of Russian energy resources, which will continue to
exist for a long time, and further reduction of economic cooperation (commodity
turnover). Ukraine has already experienced the jaws of Russia in the issue of
the oil- and gas-related debts, and in creating the situations when it has to
give its strategically significant enterprises to Russian monopolies (Mykolayiv
aluminous plant, Odessa oil refinery).
Also, and at
the same time, possible are insistent proposals to enhance and expand the military as well as military and technical relations between the Russian
Federation and Ukraine, especially as regards cooperation in the fields of
outer space control and anti-aircraft defense. Much attention will be paid to
solving, in favor of Moscow, the issue of the Black Sea Fleet stationing in
Ukraine, its technical rearmament, and economic infrastructure support. It is
not a coincidence that on the eve of V.Putins visit to Sevastopol Black Sea
Fleet Commander Komoyedov articulated the demand to extend the term of
stationing the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Ukraine after the corresponding
agreement expires.
Without
changing the course aimed at profound military and political integration of the
post-soviet area under the domination of Russia, which was declared by
B.Yeltsin in early 1995, President V.Putin, in order to implement Russias
political objectives, will utilize integration of law enforcement agencies and
coercive structures of the CIS countries, in particular, under the pretext of
combatting terrorism and organized crime. Such integration will be a basis for
development of relations with, for instance, obstinate Uzbekistan and other
Islam-oriented countries. Quite probable are antiterrorist actions against
the Afghan Taliban that has been recently confirmed by S.Yastrzhembsky, Advisor
to the President of Russia, and Foreign Minister I.Ivanov.
As regards
Ukraine, alerting are certain statements made by A.Lukashenko in the interview
to RTR at the end of May. According to A.Lukashenko, the main purpose of the
Collective Security Treaty is ensuring security of the states that have
established a common economic space in the neighborhood of NATO. The Belarusian
president would like to see Ukraine among the parties to CST, which, in his
opinion, is still undetermined as to where to seek for support of its security.
Since no one expects it in the West, Ukraine may be compelled to accede to
CST by any serious problem like those existing in the south of CIS, - said the
president of Belarus.
A.Lukashenko
is at times too outspoken, which is something the Russian president cannot
afford. Among the problems that Ukraine may face in this sense the most
probable is the Crimean issue, with its components of the Crimean Tatars, Black
Sea Fleet and Sevastopol, Crimean separatism. Wishfully and with certain
preparation, radical elements among the Crimean Tatars could quite easily be
provoked to an armed revolt. Another option is acts of terrorism, similar to
those that brought V.Putin to power and that could be incriminated to the
Crimean Tatars. It is in order to curb terrorism that Ukraine would have to
accede to CST, especially if the West tries to protect the rights of the
Crimean Tatars by exerting certain pressure on Ukraine, possibly even after the
Kosovo scenario. Let us reflect on the rhetorical question whether the
resignation of the Kunitsyn government, that, in the opinion of R.Chubarov,
leaves the Crimean Tatars alone face to face with L.Grach, could be a step
towards implementation of such a scenario?
Clearly, to
that end, it is also necessary to embroil Ukraine with the West, which is still
hoping that the Yushchenko government will carry out radical reforms. It is
predictable that V.Yushchenkos would-be resignation, insistently prompted to
L.Kuchma, and appointment of a new, pro-Russian, government will mean the
beginning of implementation of Ukraines re-integration scenario, with such
elements as accession to CST and the Customs Union and, eventually, to the
Union state through a steerable referendum.
But at
present, we are witnessing a smoother preparation a reconnaissance attack
in expectation of more serious developments. To increase the Commonwealth
integration potential, Moscow is increasing its political pressure on the
member-states under the pretext of protection of rights of the ethnic Russians
and Russian-speaking population. In view of the notorious note of the Russian
Foreign Ministry concerning the alleged violation of rights of the
Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, following V.Putins to Kyiv, there
even were expectations of removal of Ukraines vice-prime minister for
humanitarian issues from office. In the same context, not being content with
curbing the independent press and media inside Russia, the Russian leadership
raised the issue that similar actions should be taken in Ukraine, regarding the
Chechen information centers as tools of the terrorists. On the eve of the U.S.
presidents visits to Kyiv and Moscow, Russia, however, is behaving with more
restraint towards Ukraine demonstrating friendly intentions and fraternal
unity; it will eventually determine its behavior depending on the outcome of
the talks with B.Clinton. If the West concedes Ukraine, V.Putins hands will
be free.
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