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INTERNATIONAL STANDING OF UKRAINE, ITS FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: RESULTS OF THE FIRST HALF OF 2005CPCFPU presents overview of the main Ukraine’s tendencies of foreign and security policy in the first and second quarters of 2005. The analysis is based on the results of two expert polls, held in April and July according to traditional methods among four groups people majoring in analysis, planning and examination of foreign and security policy of Ukraine and with political decisions as well (representatives of state authorities and state analytical structures, military elite, non governmental organizations, journalists). 55 people were interviewed in April and 73 in July of 2005. Nataliya Parkhomenko 1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF UKRAINE It is common to evaluate certain action of state authorities exactly after first hundred days of their governing. These 100 days of the new President and new government happened during the first quarter of 2005. It won’t be correct to evaluate just this period as at least part of the success in the foreign political arena were due to the Orange Revolution. After memorable events of November-December 2004, democratic forces of the world gave an incredible credit of trust to the new Ukrainian government. Meanwhile, the international community had a chain of expectations for implementation of the declared changes. Changes in the attitude towards Ukraine and Ukrainians could be noticed during the majority of Viktor Yushchenko’s official visits. However, the more time passed since the inauguration of the new President, the more evident was the understanding that the attitude changed in advance and Ukraine must go through numerous transformations in order to justify those expectations. After the elections Ukraine remained the country with great differences between regions in terms of the position on the foreign policy. Though pessimistic forecasts of Russian political experts about future division of Ukraine into ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ proved to be false, new government must make great efforts in order to stop the possible artificial cause for confrontations as it happened in the second half of 2004. So far, the experts are carefully optimistic evaluating the changes achieved. In July the bigger part (56,2%) (April data– – 40%) of the experts noted no changes in this regard (August – 24,6%, April – 36,4%. In January the number was 59,7%), The number of those who think that these changes are still being improved as well as those who noted their leveling (August – 15.1%, April – 21,8%) lowered to some extend. It must be noted that this option was supported by 9,7% of interviewed in January. In general the experts gave positive evaluation of the influence made by the government headed by Yuliya Tymoshenko on the situation with the state foreign policy. This work was highly evaluated, which is caused not so much by the success of the President and the government but by the absolute inefficiency of the previous authorities. We can apply the abovementioned facts more to the April survey as the positive expert evaluation started to go down in August. For example, in April while answering the question ‘how is the work of the new President and the government inflected in the international situation of Ukraine’ the majority of the interviewed experts noticed positive changes: 40% considered that ‘real progress in supporting Ukrainian interests on international arena was achieved’, and more than half of experts (52,7%) admitted that ‘the conditions of Ukrainian interests implementation are getting better though without a noticeable progress’. A tendency to worsening was noted only by 1,8% of experts while this number was 63% during the work of government of Yanukovych in October 2004. In August the number of those who admitted the achievement of real progress lowered to 20,5%, while 4,2% noted that international position became worse and 6,8% noted the absence of changes. The option about ‘improvement without noticeable progress’ proved to be the most popular – 68,5%. The similar change of the expert evaluation could be due to the new government having been not able to convert the before gained trust into noticeable successes practically in none of the prior ways to Euro-Atlantic integration (NATO, EU, WTO, acquiring the status of the country with market economy). Unfortunately the list of honours ‘for revolution’ awarded to the President Yushchenko in several countries cannot be taken as great achievements. Changes in domestic political situation in Ukraine didn’t as well influence the expert evaluation of external threats for national security and territorial integrity of Ukraine. Like in January 2005 points of view of the interviewed people split. More than a third of the experts (34,2% in August and 34,5% in April), think that such threat doesn’t exist yet but it can come out any time (in Januarу 38,9% had the same opinion). About 40% of the interviewed don’t see any threats for Ukrainian territorial integrity and security and think that Ukraine is able to prevent its appearance (January result – 37,5%). The number of supporters of categorical opinion about threats for national and territorial security of our country: August rate 17,8% (in April – 16,4%, in January– 20,8%). In August 4,1% of experts thought that such threat may become real in 2-3 years (in January – 2,8%, in April – 9,1%), and 2,7% expect it in 3-5 years. 2. UKRAINE AND INTERNATIONAL INTERGRATION PROCESSES During the first half of 2005 the priority for Ukraine’s integration direction was finally outlined. If the old government didn’t verbally deny the importance of the Euro-Atlantic integration and joined some uncertain Euro-Asian projects for the sake of support during the elections, the new government declared its ambitious plans for Ukrainian membership in the European Union and NATO. If NATO leaders favoured this signal the reaction of the European Union was colder. If ministers and commissioners from the European Union took the announcements of official Kyiv about its Euro-integration ambitions skeptically rightfully naming them “Euro-imitation” at the beginning of 2005 the rapid speed taken by Ukraine in this matter became a problem, which is difficult to react to for official Brussels. Ukrainian officials’ statements on Ukraine’s participation in the Single Economic Space haven’t gone beyond the declarations announced during the Presidential elections: such membership is possible only after thorough study of all documents and analysis of accordance of the membership to national interests of Ukraine. Such position of the new government deprived some active fans of SEU of proofs to the absolute anti Russian position of the new team in power. However, everyone including Russia realized that SEU isn’t among Ukraine’s priorities. Thus during the first half of 2005 the following situation formed around integration processes Ukraine took part in: 1. Ukraine wants to join the EU but it is not possible in the nearest future 2. Ukraine wouldn’t like to join the Single Economic Space, but for many reasons it can’t totally reject the “integration game” in terms of this union. 3. The biggest efforts must be concentrated around achieving most real aims – joining NATO and WTO. However, starting from June 2005 we could notice a certain deviation from the positions mentioned above and the ghost of SES appeared on the Ukrainian foreign political horizons again. Ukraine and the EU The first half of 2005 was the period of activating the dialogue between Ukraine and the EU, the dialogue that was in fact frozen by the previous government. During the final stage of election battles Viktor Yushchenko more than once declared Ukraine’s joining the EU as strategic goal of his future work as the President. Leaders of the EU member states somehow expressed their support for such objectives of Ukrainian opposition at that time. Supporting words addressed to Viktor Yushchenko and his ambitious European plans could be taken as an informal start of negotiations about possible Ukraine’s entering the EU in the nearest future. But in spring of 2005 the voices of those politicians who skeptically take the idea about further EU enlargement gained force. Mainly they referred to the fact that victory of the Orange Revolution doesn’t necessarily prove that Ukraine in some fantastic way already meets all the criteria set for the candidate countries. Preventing such and other possible arguments the new government started to take steps aimed at real cooperation between Ukraine and the EU. Even the position of the Vice Prime Minister on the European integration headed by Oleg Rybachuk was formed in the structure of the government. Energy and persistence of the work of the new Prime Minister weren’t fully supported by many fans of the European course of integration both inside and outside Ukraine. For example, Rybachuk’s repeated statement about Ukraine’s intention to apply for EU membership already during current year inclined the European Commission representatives to give a diplomatic advice not to rush with such statements until Ukraine has something else apart from democratic presidential elections. Without denying Ukraine’s future opportunity to join the EU both President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner offered Ukraine to implement global economic transformations firsthand, to finish social democratization processes, to change the legislative field, to enter WTO and when Ukraine finally reaches the necessary level, the negotiations about entering the EU might be started. It is worth of mentioning that not all the EU member states have been unanimously positive on Ukraine’s membership in the EU. Ukraine obtained many positive signals about its European perspective, especially from the new members of the EU. Leaders of Poland, Hungary, Baltic countries repeatedly supported Ukraine in the chosen course. In the Swiss city of Davos the EU Commissioner for Enlargement also stated that EU can’t close its doors for Ukraine as it is a European country. Besides he favourably evaluated the ambitious intentions of the Ukrainian President concerning signing an Agreement on Association membership by 2007. The experts remain their support of the European integration of Ukraine. In August 87% of the interviewed gave an answer ‘yes’ to the question ‘whether joining the EU meets Ukrainian national interests’ (64,6% – absolutely ‘yes’ та ‘more yes than no’ – 22,4%). In April this data was relevantly 56,4% and 38,2%. 5,2% of the experts (April – 1,8%) doubt the necessity of the European course and even less ( 1,7%) are totally against it (April –1,8%). Does joining the EU meet Ukrainian national interests?  Defining the reasons that hamper Ukraine’s way to the EU, the experts gave the ‘first place’ to the slow economic reforms (73,3% in August), that traditionally were the important factor of slowing Ukraine’s movement to Europe but they took the first place in the rating for the first time. After eliminating the majority of only political obstacles, government economic policy became the center of experts’ attention. Taking into account its incompliance with the European integration tasks, absence of clear and transparent program of actions to be taken by the President and government as well as the economic policy was criticized by the experts in the first place. Attention must also be paid to rapid growth of this factor comparing to April of the current year: from 47,3% to 73,3%, that shows serious experts’ disappointment with the reformative abilities of the government. Second important, in experts’ opinion, is the influence of the Russian factor (53,4%). The factor itself was never the leader of obstacles in the European way of Ukraine but in April 2005 this factor was viewed as the most important (49,1%). This was influenced mainly by the Russian position during election campaign and constant attempts to interfere into internal matters of the countries of the former Soviet Union. Experts consider the type of mentality and social organization inherited from the Soviet Union to be the next factor constraining Ukrainian Euro-integration policy (August – 44,8%, April 41,8%). Traditionally it is considered to be the key factor that causes slow speed of European modernization of Ukraine. Inability of leaders to practically implement the course towards the European integration that was in the top of surveys at the beginning of 2004 was noted only by 16% of the interviewed in April. Evidently this subdued great expectations of experts (and as a matter of fact of the whole society) for the breakthrough of new team. And it is absolutely natural that the experts’ mistrust in the abilities of state leaders to define and implement strategic priorities doubled during the survey in August (33,6%). From 30 to 40 percent of experts’ voices was given to such factors as corruption and organized criminality (38,8%) – the value of this factor didn’t change together with the change of the political regime. And such obstacle as the indifference of executive EU structures towards Ukraine found even more supporters in the first half of 2005 than in July of the previous year. Probably, this is the outcome of the cold evaluations given to European perspectives of Ukraine on behalf of official Brussels, at least the expectations about changes in this situation were more optimistic at the beginning of the year. So the experts pointed out such main obstacles for integration of Ukraine to the EU in the first half of 2005:
Small group of experts (in August – 2,6%, in April – 3,6%) considered that there are no obstacles for European integration of Ukraine. Ukraine and the Russian Federation Viktor Yushchenko’s victory after the Presidential elections of 2004 opened a perspective for renewing the format of relations between Ukraine and Russia. Though the first official visit of the President Viktor Yushchenko was to the Russian Federation, as to the previous declarations, the new Ukrainian government demonstrated absolutely new principles and approaches towards bilateral relations between Ukraine and Russia. Announcing the name of new Ukrainian Prime Minister before the departure to Moscow seemed as a challenge to the Northern neighbour. It could be in the past when Kremlin used to approve even less important positions during the term of President Leonid Kuchma and when the Russian military prosecutor opened a criminal case on Yuliya Tymoshenko and she was listed in the international search. Under other circumstances, the Russian authorities could have provoked a mass media attack against “unapproved” Prime Minister if not influencing the decision of the new Ukrainian leader. This time they could only poorly perform glad faces. President Putin used his limit of mistakes while congratulating Viktor Yanukovych on his victory twice, having now to select his comments carefully. On the other hand President Yushchenko and representatives of the new Ukrainian government took some steps aimed at lessening the tension in the bilateral relations. Number of interviews given by Yushchenko to Russian mass media was evidently aimed at changing the negative image of “aggressive anti-Russian nationalists” created for Yushchenko’s team by Russian mass media during the elections. Meeting of the Ukrainian President with Russian businessmen in Kyiv had to assist this. The aim was to demonstrate the sincerity of the Ukrainian government that is ready to favor the investments in Ukrainian economy regardless of the place where the funds comes from. A message to not be afraid of any repressions or any revenge for the Russian role in the last Ukrainian elections was given to Russian business. After the election silence, the period when both parties tried not to make sharp statements and steps didn’t last long. The fact of problems remaining unsolved proved to be important – for example, issues pertaining to the location of Russian Black Sea fleet in Crimea. The attempt of the officials from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to clarify on the aspects of The Russian Marines activity corresponding to the signed international agreement failed. The heads of Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation even refused to let the Ukrainian official on the rented territory of the fleet. The Russian Minister of Defense, in his turn, also gave a slight hint that marines will not leave the base in Sevastopol after 2017, which is the final date for the armed Russian troops to remain on the territory of Ukraine according to the signed Ukrainian-Russian Treaty. Apparently, Russia checked the difference of reaction demonstrated by the new Ukrainian authorities comparing to the government it dealt with during the last ten years by some inadequate actions. For example, statements from the Russian officials, incident with the ship ‘Nikolay Filchenkov’ entering territorial waters of Ukraine on the 23 March 2005 and landing its crew on the military range on the Opusk mountain, violating the rules of crossing the state border. Russia was hardly satisfied with the results as all it has got from Kyiv was a strict official reaction. However, Viktor Yushchenko emphasized on the fact that: а) all the listed incidents were something like consequences of technical disagreements between military services of two countries; b) Ukraine will strictly follow the agreement and will not demand the revision of conditions for location of the Russian marines in Crimea. And that draw a relative line Ukraine would not go beyond in the bilateral relation in the nearest future. So, it was only general outlines of the new Ukrainian-Russian relations that could be visible during the first half of 2005. However the majority of experts are not ready to be optimistic about these changes – evaluating the condition of bilateral relations of Ukraine and countries in the first half of 2005, Russia was given the lowest mark among the other countries. Ukraine-NATO The idea of joining NATO independently or together with other countries of Commonwealth of Independent States has three fours of votes during the last two surveys. 76,7% of the interviewed in August were in favour of independent entering (April – 67,3%) and 9,6% – for the entering together with other countries of Commonwealth of Independent States – (April – 9,1%). One expert during the April survey suggested his own option – remaining ‘special partnership’ with NATO. The number of those supporting the neutral or non-block status of Ukraine lowered to some extent. In April practically each fifth expert supports both positions. However in April number of those who voted for neutral status in Ukraine doubled compared to January and accordingly the number of supporters of the non-block status of our country as a prior one (3,6% in April and 12,5% in January – for the non-block and relevantly 18,2% and 9,7% for neutral status of Ukraine). In August 8,2%, were for out of block status and 5,5% – for neutral. Thus positive expert evaluation of correspondence of further cooperation with NATO to national interests of Ukraine is stable and especially clear on the background of the fact that none of the interviewed supported the idea of joining the military union of Commonwealth of Independent States (the so called Tashkent pact), as an alternative to joining NATO. Experts’ opinion divided while defining the prior ways for cooperation with NATO for Ukraine. In April the main task defined by the interviewed was extra safety guarantees for Ukaine – 49,1% (January – 38,9% October 2004 – 34%). But in August such option gained 31,5% voices of the experts. Instead the first place was taken by the option for ‘necessity of creating preconditions for Ukraine’s joining NATO in the nearest future’ – 52% (47,3% in April, 43,1% in January 2005, 42% – in October 2004). Straight way to military reforms is considered to be the most prior one – 34,6% (in April – 43,6%). The importance of preparing Ukraine for possible membership is mentioned by 28,7% of experts (in April – 40%, in January – 30,5%). The option ‘cooperation with NATO is absolutely unnecessary’ was chosen by 1,4% (April – 3,6%) of the interviewed – probably these experts are sincere supporters of the non-block status of Ukraine. Trade of weapon, special equipment, military and technical services was considered as a prior way of cooperation by every 8th expert–13,7 % (in April one fourth of the interviewed had the same opinion – 27,3%). Necessity for mutual developing of conceptual principles of military policy was noted by 26% of the experts (in April – 25,4%). 30,1% of the interviewed think that our country needs NATO’s assistance in creating the system of democratic control over the military forces (in April – 23,6%). A great number of experts (27,4%) think that Ukrainian military industrial sector needs direct assistance of NATO. In April this position was noted by 18,2% of the interviewed (in January – 12,7%, October 2004 – 16%). The need of NATO’s assistance in professional training was admitted by 20,5% (in April – 14,5 %). Much less experts note the importance of mutual studies for Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO: 5,5% (January 2005 – 10,9%) and Ukraine’s participation in peace keeping operations– 9,6% (in April – 3,6%). Other integration processes In general, expert position on the foreign and security policy concerning joining Single Economic Space with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus remains negative. Naturally there appeared no new reasons for supporting the creation of such integration unity, at least in the format that had been imposed on Ukraine during last Presidential elections. While answering the question ‘Does joining Single Economic Space meet national interests of Ukraine?’ 47,9% said ‘no’ in August (in April – 54,5%, in January – 51,5 %, in October 2004 – 59%); the option ‘more no than yes” was chosen by 30,1% (in April – 27,3%, January – 33,3%, in October 2004- 25 %), ‘more yes than no’ – 13,7% (April – 12,7%, January – 8,3%, October 2004 – 10 %). In August and January 6,8 % of the interviewed experts definitely said ‘yes’ for joining SES (in April – 5,4%). The position of Ukrainian experts concerning Ukraine’s membership in WTO didn’t change as well. Among the interviewed nine out of ten traditionally support such step and no more than one or two experts are against it. The main difference from the previous surveys was the fact that more experts choose the ‘compromise’ variant ‘more yes than no’. The explanation to that might be the following: the more perspective appears for joining WTO, the clearer are the problems in some segments of Ukrainian economy in this regard. In conclusion, whether joining World Trade Organization meets national interests of Ukraine (August of 2005 survey): 
Yes – 74 % (in April 65,4%) More yes than no – 21,8% (in April 29,1%) More no than yes– 1,4% (in April 1,8 %) No – 1,4% (in April 1,8%). It’s hard to say – 1,4%(in April – 1,8%) 3. STATE OF TWO FOLD RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND UNIONS International priorities of Ukraine Since the previous survey the experts remained the same position about the top five leaders Ukraine should treat as priority in building the mutual relations. The first place was given to the EU by 82,2% of the interviewed (in April – 70,9%, in January – 88,9%). In August 2005 the priority of relations with the USA was admitted by 72,6% (in April – 61,8%, in January – 73,6%) of the experts. NATO rates lowered to some extend – 37% (in April – 49,1%, January rate – 47,2%), and instead the Russian Federation begins to return to its positions. In August 67,1% mentioned it among those countries Ukraine should build relations with first of all. In April only 43,6% had the same opinion (January 2005 – 58,3%, October 2004 – 55%). Such changes are influenced by the fact that in the first quarter of 2005 there were the following expectations: new democratic government will be more independent while developing its foreign policy in such a way when all the participants will be equal partners and not the members of ‘supervisory board’ that makes sure whether the order and rules of the game in the country are kept. However, it have already been summer when it became clear that some expectations were unreal and the country is unable to come out from the ‘field of attraction’ of powerful players on the international arena . Poland significantly lost its positions in this rating –24,6% in August (in April – 30,9%, 41,7 % in October 2004). It occupies fifth or sixth position together with the WTO (also 24,6%). Germany and China have got less “fans”. In October Germany gathered only 8,2% of votes, while it had 11,1% during the survey in January and – 18,2% in April. Priority of the bilateral relations with China was admitted by 5,5% of the interviewed (in April – 12,7%). At the same time in terms of approaching the date of joining WTO support for defining it as the priority becomes higher – 24,6% (April – 10,9%). GUUAM which was reanimated from its two year “lethargic sleep” also gradually gains points (in April and August – 10,9%, while it had only 2,8% in January). Among the other priorities are relations with the Council of Europe, Baltic countries, United Nations, countries of Commonwealth of Independent States, Canada, Kazakhstan, United Kingdom, Turkey, Romania, Single Economic Space, IAEA, Japan, Czech Republic, Turkmenistan. The countries that Ukraine has the most successful relations with. Without any doubt, the leaders of the April survey was the United States of America – 92,7% (in January – 31,9%), which may be due to American tour of the President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko. Success he had during his visit to the USA, allowed to state the new level of relations between the USA and Ukraine. However the tendency of a higher rate of the Ukrainian-American successful relations had been already noticeable since the end of 2004 (in October 2004 the support rate made up 14%, in July of the same year – 17,1%). That’s why the results of August survey seem more striking as the support is twice smaller – 47,9%. We must admit that the last number is more adequate as there wasn’t any noticeable breakthrough in the Ukrainian-American relations during the first half of 2005. In August Poland was the leader and it remains its special position in the foeign political system of coordinates – 71, 2% of the interviewed share this opinion (in April – 78,2%). Such evaluation fully corresponds to the sufficiency of the Ukrainian-Polish contacts during the first half of 2005 and the efforts made by Poland in the process of regulating internal Ukrainian conflict. The third place (both in April and in August) is this rating is for Georgia, as been expected. (in April – 61,8%, in August – 38,2%). The fourth position is taken by the European Union. This position considerably varied: in January – 33,3%, in April – 23,6%, in August – 35,6%. The extra points the EU gained inthis survey are to the role the EU played in settling the political crisis in Ukraine at the end of 2004 and beginning of 2005. However, for the daily relations there is a numberof unsettled questions that doesn’t contribute to the experts’ certainty. NATO takes the fifth place having multiplied its result at the beginning of the year – 31,5%. However in April, it even had 50,9%, and in January –only 12,5%. These ‘ups and downs’ are also totally understandable if we take into consideration activating the cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. The leader of October and July surveys in 2004, Russian Federation, has got the lowest percent of successful bilateral relations evaluation in April and August of 2005– 5,4% та 8,2% accordingly. Just to compare: in January 2005 this rate was 19,4%, in October 2004 – 57%, in July – 59, 6%. Thus we may state the appearance of firm tendency towards cooling in Ukrainian-Russian relations. According to results of the second quarter of 2005, GUUAM took the sixth place with 12,3%. As the future of this organization is not totally clear (taking into account Uzbekistan walkout and the special attitude of Azerbaijan) we may consider these numbers as a special ‘optimistic advance payment’ from the experts. Taking into account active contacts of the President of Ukraine with leaders of Georgia and Moldova, the high evaluation of successful Ukrainian-Moldavian relations could be expected. In April Moldova had the sixth place and in August – the eighth (however with very little l– 10,9% and 6,8%) in the rating of the most successful foreign political partners of Ukraine. Among the bilateral relations Baltic countries, Lithuania, Chezh Republic, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Romany, WTO, United Nations Organization, countries of Vyshegrad group and Hungary were mentioned by the experts. Qualitative situation of Ukraine’s current relations with its key foreign partners In April and August questionnaires the experts were asked the questions about the qualitative situation of relation with key partners of Ukraine– European Union, Russian Federation and the United States of America. Options (no more than three) could be chosen from such list: “approaching”, “distance”, “stability”, “stagnation”, “satellite dependence of Ukraine”, “equal partnership” “unequal partnership”, “competition”, “tension”, “hostility”, “mutual dependence”, “client patronizing relations”. The experts could also note their own options of characterizing the relations. The following data was obtained: Characterizing the qualitative situation of current relations of Ukraine with its key foreign partners
Thus during the first half of 2005 the most noticeable quality changes were achieved in relations between Ukraine and Russia, where a firm tendency towards distance, tension growth and competition was noticed (from one third up to one half of experts evaluate relations between Russian Federation and Ukraine in this way). Activating bilateral relations between Ukraine and the USA caused ‘approaching’ in experts’ evaluations. At the same time relations between Ukraine and the USA are viewed as ‘client patronizing’ and a tendency towards growth of ‘unequal, non symmetric partnership’ between them. And the high rate of Ukraine’s approaching the EU was also characterized by growth of equality in partnership. 4. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF DEFENCE POLICY Appointing the head of respectable analytical non-government organization (Ukrainian Center for Economic and Politic Studies named after O. Razumkov) to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine allowed to speak about real move towards introducing the system of civil control over the army. Though A. Grytsenko cannot be regarded as a totally civil Minister (he has higher military education and is a colonel of reserve), without any doubt he is the first one the society is willing to perceive in such position (as a Minister not from military forces). The new Minister declared his ambitious plans concerning reforming the Armed Forces including such sensitive sphere as limiting the terms of military service and transformation into fully professional army. But the first statements and steps of the new Minister didn’t influence the expert evaluation of possibility of introduction effective system of civil control. In April and August they evaluated the given possibility mainly as a ‘satisfactory’ оnе (56,4% та 54,8%). A little less than one half of the interviewed consider it to be ‘small’ (April – 18,2%, August – 17,8 %). 15% in August and 18,2% in April considered such perspective to be a ‘good’ one (January rate- 38,9% ). Nevertheless, the number of those who see no such perspectives (‘zero’) lowered to some extent– 1,4%-1,8% in April-August compared to 4,2% in January. In August every tenth (11%) of the interviewed couldn’t answer this question. As to situation in the military industrial sector, expectations, spotted in January survey held while the government has not been yet formed, are rather exaggerated. However, two following surveys adjusted the results. The percent of experts who support the idea of gaining improvement in tackling stagnation of the military industrial sector is almost three times smaller – from 9,7% in January to 3,6% in April. In August this rate remained– 4,1%. More than a quarter of interviewed in January and April tend to consider them as ‘low’ (27,3% and 20,8% accordingly). In August this number was raised to more than a third of experts – 35,6%. About the same number of the interviewed consider them to be ‘satisfactory’: 41,1% in August, 38,2% in April. Absence of such possibilities (‘zero’) was marked by 8,2% (August) and 9,1% (April) (in January – 2,8%). In August the number of those who couldn’t give the answer to the question raised – 11% comparing to 5,5% in January and 5,4% in April. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Ukrainian Parliament work on the foreign policy, defense and national security practically has not change. Not many experts consider such work to be ‘significant’– 1,8% in April and 2,7% in August (in January – 4,2%). In August 34,2% defined it as a ‘satisfactory’ while this number was 43,6% and 48,6 % during the previous surveys. 58,9% (August) of experts (April data – 47,3%) continue to evaluate the work of the Parliament as ‘bad’ and 2,8% as ‘zero’ (in April 5,1%). 1,4% of the interviewed in August couldn’t answer this question and 1,8% – in April. 5. FACTORS OF INFLUENCE ON THE FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF UKRAINE The question about the influence on the formation of the foreign Ukrainian policy wasn’t included into the January survey as it was held in the period without a government. At that times it was difficult to evaluate the role of certain political forces and institutions in forming the foreign policy of Ukraine. In April the first steps taken by new government gave the possibility for experts to analyze the differences between it and the last government of Kuchma. Comparison of the ‘level of influence’ of Presidential Administration headed by V. Medvedchuk and Presidential Secretariat headed by O. Zinchenko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed by O.Gryshchenko and then by B. Tarasuk is very interesting. The results of April survey as it had been expected are totally different from the results of the previous year. In October 2004 the absolute leaders in the surveys were the Presidential Administration, family (limited number of people around the President of Ukraine) and financial industrial groups which proved the lobbying purposes of forming and implementing the prior ways of foreign policy. In April Cabinet of Ministers became the leader in the surveys and the second place with slight difference was taken by the Ministry of Foeign Affairs. The next places (with slight difference as well) were taken by Presidential Secretariat and the Council of National Security and Defense of Ukraine. The regrouping of forces of influence to advantage of those institutions that must solve these problems according to the Constitution and other laws of Ukraine is quite obvious. However the fifth place in the rating taken by such factor of foreign policy influence as ‘small informal surrounding of the President” that causes unfinished positive changes in the governing. The mass media called this a change from ‘kuchmizm’ policy into “kumizm” (family relations) system. Also significant is quite equal division of percentage given to political players that characterizes the April expert survey. In October the rating leader – Presidential Administration – got 86% (in July 2004 the experts gave 82,9% to Bankova Street), which is almost one third more than the Small informal circle of people around the President – 57% (in July 2004 – 68,1%) or the financial industrial groups – 42% (in July 2004 – 57,4%). April survey stated a rather relevant leadership with general difference of about 10% between four favorites. And now let’s compare the results of answers to the question ‘Which state institutions and elite groups inside Ukraine mainly influence the foreign policy of Ukraine?’ in April and August 2005 (percent number is more than 100 as the experts could choose from three options):
The experts consider that during the first six months of the Orange team actions, the influence of the Parliament, Cabinet of Ministers and President in particular on formation of the foreign policy of Ukraine significantly lowered but the position of financial industrial groups and President’s surrounding gained more power. As it was before, Ukraine remains under the certain influence from the two foreign policy players: the USA and the Russian Federation. However, the leaders of the survey exchanged their places: if Russia held the first place with the result of 94% in October it was ousted by the USA which gained 90,9% voices of the experts in April. However, in August the difference between these two players was shortened to 4%. The European Union joined the leaders. In comparison to October survey in 2004 its influence rate is several times bigger. Expanding the EU influence on the foreign policy of Ukraine may be considered as a positive factor because greater EU’s interest in Ukrainian issues improves the chances for faster democratic changes that are necessary for Ukraine’s membership in the EU in the next ten years. EU influence rates in April and October remained the same. Positions of NATO became stronger in the experts’ opinion as NATO representatives mentioned the real perspectives of Ukraine’s membership in this organization more than once. All this changed relevance of influence of the foreign actors on Ukrainian policy. States and institutions that represent ‘West’ have at their general disposal much greater impact possibilities than Russia. In general, the answers to the question ‘Which foreign partners of Ukraine mostly influence the process of decision making in Ukraine?’ were divided on the following way in April and August of 2005: 
1. United States of America– 82,2% (in April – 90,9%) 2. Russian Federation– 78,1% (in April – 69,1%) 3. European Union– 56,1% (in April – 56,4%) 4. International Monetary Fund, other financial institutions– 13,7% (in April – 27,3%) 5. NATO – 15,1% (in April –23,6 %) 6. Transnational corporations– 16,4% (in April – 23,6%) 7. European Council– 9,6% (in April –3,6%) 8. OSCE – 2,7% (in April – 3,6%) 9. United Nations Organization – 2,7% (in April – 3,6%) 6. MAIN GOALS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY The experts were offered 14 options of goals for their consideration (they also had the opportunity to add one more option – in case if it was not listed), and they had 3 points scale to evaluate each option. There were such options for each goal: 1 – ‘very important, 2- ‘important’, 3-‘secondary’. Experts could also answer ‘it does not meet Ukrainian interests’. So the lower was the obtained point the higher is the position of the goal in the list. In August the experts gave the first place to entering WTO. This position obtained noticeably more votes than the leader of previous survey – maintaining and developing transit potential. The experts consider assisting in obtaining global investments from the West and the idea of shifting to the format of Association relations with the EU with membership perspective to be traditionally important (and, as it still seems – absolutely real for implementation). Probably such position is due to the real expert evaluation of Ukraine’s future, its current possibilities and their correspondence to political ambitions. Taking into account the complex and long term procedure of acquiring EU membership, the development of unique transit possibilities is the most convenient option for Ukraine to keep attracting attention from EU countries. Thus the rating of main goals of the foreign policy of Ukraine composed on the basis of April and August surveys is the following: 1. Accession to World Trade Organization– 1.40 points (in April – 1,57 points) 2. Maintaining and developing transit potential – 1,44 points (in April 1,36 points) 3. Assisting global investments from Western countries– 1,46 points (in April – 1,52 points) 4. Transferring to Association relations with the EU with membership perspective – 1,54points (in April 1,50) 5. Developing mutually useful and equal relations with the Russian Federation– 1,59 (in April – 1,64 points) 6. Improving cooperation with the countries of Central Eastern Europe – 1,61 points (in April 1,96) 7. Promoting Ukraine towards NATO membership – 1,73 (in April 1,80 points) 8. Priority of developing relations with the USA –1,88 points (in April – 1,98 points) 9. Improving cooperation inside GUUAM– 1,97 points (in April – 2,00 points) 10. Actual activity in OSCE, United Nations and other international organizations – 2,10 points (in April – 2,36 points) 11. Developing relations with China, India and other Asian leaders– 2,19 points (in April – 2,39 points) 12. Initiating new peaceful ideas, supporting the policy of disarmament and control over weapons– 2,50 (in April – 2,62 points) Apart from the abovementioned goals the experts named creating Baltic-Black Sea Union an ‘important’ goal for the foreign policy of Ukraine. Such plans exist since the beginning of nineties but this goal can be achieved only on a condition of the last missing chain (Belarus) joining this unity. During the first quarter of 2005 a number of those who are absolutely against ‘Euro-Asian integration’ lowered to some extend, but experts traditionally mention such goals that don’t meet national interests of Ukraine:
· The first months of 2005 were unique in Ukrainian history: the world became interested in Ukraine; the new President was warmly welcomed in Washington, Brussels, Berlin and Warsaw. For the first time since the Declaration of Independence the new President clearly defined the foreign policy tasks that are aimed at choosing Euro-Atlantic integration dimension. For the first time, the expectation for new team to be capable of achieving this aim appeared. · During the first months of governing this team made numerous mistakes but the comparison with its predecessors who brought one of the biggest European countries to the edge of the international isolation ‘saved’ the new team from serious criticism for a while. · Over January-June of 2005 the official visits and meeting of the Ukrainian government clearly circled the international priorities of Ukraine. It’s natural that relations with the EU, USA and Russian Federation are among the priorities. If Ukraine has new problems caused by its actual, not just declared, intensions to join the EU in the relations with EU, in the relations with Russia, still one problem remains – stubborn unwillingness of the Russian Federation to see Ukraine as an efficient independent country. The lesson learned during the presidential elections hardly became for the Russian government such lesson that will guarantee Ukraine no further Russian attempts to interfere its internal affairs. The course on membership in WTO has been renewed. The perspective of accessing this organization in 2005 seemed as a rather reachable objective, but in order to achieve it the Ukrainian government and Parliament had to take a number of steps that would have different consequences for domestic industry. The general course on accessing NATO has been maintained. For the first time over the last years such problem as ensuring human rights, democratic election procedures and freedom of speech in Ukraine were not mentioned in the agenda of Ukrainian relations with this organization. The perspectives of developing cooperation in the military sphere and assistance in reforming Ukrainian army may be evaluated in a rather optimistic way.
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