Ukraine was the last stop in the U.S. president’s farewell tour to Europe (before the next presidential elections) that included four countries. The agenda and program of B.Clinton’s visit to Kyiv were covered by mass media and assessed by experts. Assessments were quite varied, and disputes referred not only to specific items of the agenda, but also to determining the main issue, i.e. the goals and aftermath of the visit.

What was the purpose of the visit? According to the leading Western media – to get assurances of the unconditional closure of the Chornobyl nuclear power plant (NPP) before the end of the year. According to Russian analysts – to demonstrate the U.S. willingness to continue supporting the pro-Western political regime in Kyiv. According to the Ukrainian side – to confirm the “strategic partnership” invariability and to enlist support in the negotiations with the international finance institutions. The complexity in determining the goals and motivations of the visit resulted from the fact that this political action, with its somewhat extravagant events, turned out to be rather closely intertwined with the fabric of the present-day political relations.

Despite the flash-like nature of the visit (B.Clinton stayed in Kyiv for only 6 hours), the disclosed subjects and motives refer to a rather broad range of issues – from the interests of the American business in Ukraine to fires at peateries around the Chornobyl NPP, from the success in democratic and market transformations, desirable for Ukraine, to victory in the presidential elections, desirable for the Democratic Party of USA. Analyzing the visit of the U.S. President to Kyiv on June 5, 2000 in the context of concurrent developments, one can trace both the logic of development of the present-day international relations and the interests of the U.S. and Ukrainian political elites, which, incommensurable as they are, have again proved useful to one another.

The idea of the U.S. President’s possible coming to Kyiv in the near future was for the first time disclosed during Secretary Albright’s visit in April 2000. Prior to that, in the first months of the current year, the Ukrainian-U.S. relations had developed paradoxically. The restructuring of the Ukrainian debt by the international finance institutions may be regarded as a measure aimed to support the new government of V.Yushchenko. But it took place along with the crisis phenomena in the relations, which were externally manifested by the notorious publications in the British and American press, by deferring V.Yushchenko’s visit to Washington, and by dragging out with the settlement of Ukraine-IMF relations. Albright’s visit demonstrated the “warming” in the relationship that was stipulated by the outbreak of new expectations from Ukraine, specifically – from V.Yushchenko’s government. The Secretary of State, speaking live at the “1+1” Ukrainian TV studio, assessed the current situation as a “second chance” for Ukraine.

A quasi-market system that has developed in Ukraine does not suit the American partners due, first of all, to specific conditions of business undertaking, unfavorable investment atmosphere, and inadequate ensuring the property rights, with somewhat too strong accent, in the opinion of the Ukrainian side, on the intellectual property. It is a fact that Ukraine has been included into the “301 list” of countries, in which over 50% of computer software, audio and video production are manufactured and sold without observing the copyrights law. This issue was addressed during both M.Albright’s and B.Clinton’s visits to Kyiv. Accordingly, the market reforms, in the form suitable for Americans, should incorporate a distinct list of the universally recognized “rules of the game” that would open space for competition, rather than an abstract set of market-oriented rhetoric without any specific and functional meaning that has traditionally been characteristic for the post-soviet area. Compared to its predecessors, the Yushchenko government has demonstrated the greatest readiness, for implementing the long-awaited reforms, that is why the American side made several demonstrative signaling gestures in April-June to renew the external motivation for reforms in Ukraine, so badly needed by the Ukrainian side. The President "has appointed a strong Prime Minister", - said Clinton at St.Michael’s Square in Kyiv, adding that the U.S. support of Kuchma depends essentially upon following the declared course, and has nothing to do with unconditional support of a “ruling regime”, as the Russian press used to emphasize.

Another important contributor that affected the agenda and overall tonality of B.Clinton’s stay in Kyiv was the Russian factor, which is now associated with the policy of the new Russian President – Vladimir Putin. On this issue, a set of ideas and stereotypes has already been developed in the West, which significantly affects the U.S. attitude, as a leader of the Euro-Atlantic community, to Russia itself and the countries where Russia would like to establish its hegemony. Ukraine is a most typical example of such a state. In addition, the United States has interests in the region, based on geopolitical considerations.

The evolution of the Russian statehood and political system in the recent months concerns the United States not because of the prospect of a direct imperial revenge (Russia has no adequate recourses for that and will not have them in the foreseeable future – any American analyst is aware of that). Threatening is the evident tendency of the Russian authorities to acquire the features of an authoritarian police regime that would put an end to expectations for development of a democratic society in Russia. The words of a NATO high official demonstrate how much the West cares namely for internal evolution of the Russian state: “If Russia is a democratic state in 10 years, we don’t care how much missiles it will have”.

Putin is not demonstrating greater opposition to the West (compared to the last period of Yeltsin’s presidency), however it is evident that the values, which the West has been trying to cultivate in Russia during 1990s, are primarily odd and alien to him. Establishing the rule of the neo-totalitarian bureaucratic machinery in Russia constitutes a significantly more serious international threat than the show-like rhetoric of Zhirinovsky or Dugin.

If the current political regime strengthens itself namely in the antidemocratic forms, Putin’s Russia can become a gravity center in the Eurasian region, especially for countries that failed in the post-communist reforms or became authoritarian from the very beginning. If the Chechnya methods of addressing regional conflicts become a legitimate standard in the post-soviet countries, the much-cherished U.S. project of establishing a solidarity area in the northern hemisphere will evidently fail. If the PR methods, based on military mobilization of electorate confronted with the “enemy” for the sake of the victory of a certain candidate in elections, become a standard in the post-soviet area, the illusion of victory of democracy will vanish along with the dream of Europe without dividing lines.

In this sense, Ukraine is the main testing area in the territory of Eastern Europe, as the Baltic states and Belarus have already opted (for absolutely opposite alternatives). From the U.S. standpoint, Ukraine is a sort of a testing ground, where the two opposite models of the post-soviet development coexist – the liberal-democratic one and the neo-totalitarian one. The United States is ready to once again promote the victory of the former model. That is why President Clinton used to reiterate the words “Boritesya Poborete” (keep on fighting and you will succeed) at St.Michael’s Square in Kyiv.

The Western media focused mainly on the Chornobyl-related issues in covering B.Clinton’s visit to Kyiv. The Reuters commentators believe that the discussion of prospective closure of the Chornobyl NPP and the date of the NPP shutdown, declared by the Ukrainian President, were the main results of President Clinton’s visit to Kyiv. The Financial Times and the Guardian reporters limited their coverage of Clinton’s stay in Kyiv to this episode only. But from the Ukrainian point of view, the Chornobyl shutdown is just implementation of the undertaken commitments without guarantees on the part of G7 that has pledged to finance the NPP closure and construction of compensating facilities.

Significant is the fact that the date of the NPP closure was announced namely in the presence of the U.S. President: European leaders could have taken the lead over the overseas leader by proposing favorable conditions to Ukraine, at least in the framework of their existing commitments. However, the EU proved to be unprepared to express a consolidated position, and became the hostage of the populist ideologems of the Greens, first of all of Germany, who are consistently and not unsuccessfully struggling for a complete ban of nuclear power engineering, being a part of the left-wing/centrist coalition government. It turned out eventually that the U.S. President is more capable of addressing the ecological problems of Europe.

Somewhat unexpectedly President Clinton’s visit to Kyiv fell into the context of disputes as regards the strategic weapons modernization plans, namely the U.S. Administration’s intention to amend the ABM Treaty of 1972. At the EU summit in Lisbon, Clinton suddenly discovered no support of reviewing the Treaty on the part of the European allies. Russia, the main opponent of the U.S. plans, was in transports of joy when it learned about the debates between the NATO leaders. However, while visiting Moscow, the U.S. President did not think it necessary to put this issue in the center of the negotiations. The fact that a major item of the U.S.-Russia agenda remains outstanding, as well as the inability to affect Russia in the Chechen issue made many analysts assess the three-day visit to Russia as a failure. The visit to the EU countries (Portugal and Germany) can hardly be called a success either, since the U.S. President did not find any support of his defense initiatives and failed to resolve trade controversies between USA and EU.

Against such a background, the visit to Ukraine could look a diplomatic success, if it were not for a too little role that Ukraine plays in the Western public opinion. Ukraine increased its certainty as regards the possibility to continue to rely on support of its overseas ally, it regained its pride as regards its significant geopolitical position that will keep it from becoming a forgotten circumference of global politics.

The U.S. major objectives and ideologems that were being more or less successfully realized during President B.Clinton’s last tour to Europe can be worded as follows:

• strengthening the U.S. leading global positions;
• appropriateness of the White House policy of active support of countries-in-transition in Central and Eastern Europe;
• public and open nature of the U.S. policy;
• demonstrating that the Democrats have a clear idea of further steps to be taken to realize the U.S. leadership, and a clear action plan pursuant to major vectors of foreign policy;
• linking the foreign policy strategy to pragmatic interests of the U.S. society, first of all, the American business.