The Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine has been carrying out an expert estimation of the state and basic trends of Ukraine's foreign policy for three years (1997, 1998 and 1999). Bellow are the results of the polls conducted during the year 1999 within the framework of the program Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine. The expert polls took place four times during the year - in March, June, September, and December of 1999.
All the polls operate with the same instruments, although with certain modifications depending on the latest course of events.
The group of experts comprised in approximately equal numbers specialists of four categories totaling between 38 and 41 person:
- Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and employees of research structures rendering advise to state structures (the National Institute of Strategic Studies, the National Institute of Russian-Ukrainian Relations, the National Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the NAS of Ukraine, etc.);
- Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine, primarily the members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS and the Committee for Defense and State Security. They represent all the political spectrum: left-wing, center, and right-wing;
- Servicemen within the Armed Forces of Ukraine having the rank not lower than lieutenant-colonel, including officials from the ministry of Defense, professors, and specialists of military higher educational institutions and research centers, most of them having scientific degrees (military professional intellectual elite);
- Leading journalists who specialize in international issues and represent the most influential mass media. There are grounds to presume that they influence not only the public opinion, but also the standpoint of political elite (the establishment).
In order to illustrate the differences in experts' conceptual preferences, their foreign policy orientations regarding the national interests of Ukraine will be compared.
During 1999, among experts' preferences there were earmarked two basic alternative foreign policy orientations. One of them envisages the inclination towards "Ukraine's accession to NATO", the other one - recognition of advantages of a "neutral and/or non-aligned status of Ukraine". The first, pro-NATO oriented group has previously remained its popularity at approximately the same level, strengthening its positions and getting a lead from time to time. However, in 1999 it starts gradually loosing its popularity. The pro-NATO oriented experts made a little less than a half of the polled: 47.5 % in March, 46.2% in September, 36.7% in June, and only 32.4% at the end of the year 1999. The quite unrealistic variant of Ukraine's "accession to NATO together with the CIS countries" (3-11.8%) can also be regarded as a pro-NATO one. However, even with this variant counted, the orientation towards the "accession to NATO" in June and December has had less support than the "neutral" and/or "non-aligned status of Ukraine" with 43.6% against 55.9%. Before the middle of 1999, the latter hardly counterbalanced the former. The variant of "Ukraine's accession to the military alliance of the CIS countries" as an alternative to the "accession to NATO" and "neutral and/or non-aligned status" is hardly mentioned (3-5% in general, except 10% at the beginning of the year) and, thus, is not worth much attention. 
General Features of Ukraine's Foreign Policy
This chapter will focus on the assessment of the level of international security in Europe, as well as state of security in Ukraine.
From the beginning to the middle of the year the state of international security in Europe was deteriorating: 86.7% of the experts polled in June assessed it as thus. The dangers that the Kosovo crisis presented effected the assessments of the European security in general. But the further estimations approximate to those made during the previous 1997 and 1998 years, although in 1999 they were still relatively low in comparison to 1998. At the end of the year, in comparison to the beginning of the year, fewer experts thought that the state of international security in Europe was "deteriorating" (29.4% in December, 48.6% in September, and 42.1% in March) and more experts thought it was actually "improving" (23.5% in December, 18.9% in September, 28% in March, but 6.7% in June). Also, at the end of the year twice as many experts, comparing to the beginning of the year, pointed out that the level of international security in Europe has been unchanged - 47.1% (23.7% in March, 32.4% in September, and 23.7% in June). Therefore, although "the Yugoslavian factor" had a tide effect on the competent experts' assessments, it is not considered a systematic danger to the European security, but rather a situational tension factor that demonstrates certain drawbacks of the European order.
Instability of the level of the international security in Europe did not have much effect on the international security of Ukraine, which has been given approximately the same estimation throughout the year and that has generally been lower than that in the previous years. At the same time security level of Ukraine has been assessed as much lower than in Europe as a whole. Most experts point out its deterioration (31.6-54.3%) and absence of change (42.9-48.7%, 63.2% in September). And only from 2.6% to 3.3% of experts consider it as "improving".
According to the experts' estimations, economic factors are pivotal in guarantying international security for Ukraine in 1999, while political factors look relatively weak in terms of influence. Only temporarily, in June, the role of political factors strengthened in comparison to economic factors. (This could be well explained by the approach of the presidential elections). Other factors, such as military, ecological, and socio-cultural factors, are still assessed as minor.
The experts estimate that Ukraine still has to follow lead of other countries or alliances, to yield to their orders or expectations, regardless its own national interests. In 1999 the Russian Federation was growing more involved in Chechen conflict, and Ukraine was keeping away from controversial issues in RF-USA (West) relations. As the result of the equidistance, that has not caused any obvious concern of the opponents-partners on the international arena, Ukraine at the same time has to rely on these countries as on its allies (throughout the year, though, there has been a decrease in the number of the experts who believe that the probability of Ukraine acting according to its allies' pressures, even if that would conflict with its own interests, is "high", while there has been an increase in the number of those who estimate this probability as "intermediate").
The estimation of the level of international security guarantees given to Ukraine by other countries remains, according to most experts, "low". This estimation has not changed significantly during the year.
During the year, especially its second half, there has been observed some gradual growth in the experts' evaluation of Ukraine's foreign policy course as to its stability, appropriateness, and predictability. Although higher than in 1998, the results of such an evaluation considering all the three criteria range between the "low" and "intermediate" marks. The estimations of the appropriateness and stability of the course are a little higher than those of predictability of the policy course. Apparently, despite certain criticism towards Ukraine's foreign policy course, experts remain tolerant in their evaluation of the Ukrainian leadership's role in international affairs, particularly of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Throughout 1999, there have been remaining high concerns among the experts about a possible emergence of a threat to territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine. In June the tension somewhat eased, while in September, as well as in March the threat became more sensible. In December fewer experts pointed out presence of immediate threat to territorial integrity -- 8.1% (6.7% in June), while it was 15% in March and 17.9% in September. However, expectations of the emergence of threat at any time have not come lower since the beginning of the year, but rather grew from 50% at the beginning of the year to 56.8% at the end. In 1-2 years the threat is expected by 5-8.1% and in 3-5 years - by 5-13.5% of experts. Smaller than usually share of experts - 13.5% (comparing to 23-25% earlier) - believed at the end of the year in total absence of threat to territorial integrity of Ukraine and presence of the necessary conditions for avoiding its emergence.
According to the experts, level of confidence of the most influential elite's' leaders in the leaders of governmental structures responsible for the foreign policy is low (particularly so in June) and intermediate (mainly in December). At the same time the group of experts that considers this level of confidence high has remained quite stable (17-20%). Such a divergence of opinion on this issue demonstrates a gap between the foreign policy elite (including the experts) and the "influential elite's' leaders". Certain autonomy of the Ukrainian foreign policy can be seen in the answers to the question about the influence of the elite's leaders on the structures responsible for the foreign policy of Ukraine. The number of those experts who consider that influence strong has been constantly decreasing throughout the year and reached 4% mark in December. Meanwhile, between 40 and 50 % experts estimated the level of elite's influence as intermediate and low.
Decline in the reputation of the present Parliament of Ukraine could not, but effect the experts' estimations. Thus, total majority of them evaluated the role of the Verkhovna Rada in foreign policy issues as insignificant or close to "0". Moreover, the number of "0" marks reached over 50% in December.
Throughout the year there have been some sensible changes in estimating regional differences in Ukraine as to the attitude towards the foreign policy course. While in March 27.5% of experts believed that those differences "intensified" or "were unchanged" (35%), in December 50% of experts said the regional differences "were leveling up" and only 2.8% still believed in the intensification of them. Apparently, this transformation can be explained by the results of the presidential elections when the winner, who openly had declared his pro-European positions, led not only in the Western Ukraine, but also in many Eastern and Southern regions.
The main adherents of the integration with Russia up to uniting into a coherent state among the Ukrainian political elite are the "left-wing deputies at the Verkhovna Rada" and "politicians of pro-Russian orientation", the experts say. Another smaller, but still essential group of influence is "socially hapless strata of population". Compared to 1998, the influence of the "regional leaders of East and South of Ukraine" and of the "entrepreneurs of Ukrainian-Russian groups" grew lesser, but remains still significant. Also, among the adherents of the integration with Russia experts point out the "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented at cooperation with Russia". "Officers of the Armed Forces" are considered as a group with a low interest in complete integration in this direction. There are not any other groups mentioned among the main adherents of this integration.
The experts pointed out some events that had either "positive" or "negative" effect on the international position of Ukraine and the level of its security. Among the "positive" there are: a) temporary membership of Ukraine to the UN Security Council (100%); b) membership of Ukraine in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (97.1%); c) successful start of the implementation of "Sea start" Project (97.1%); d) removal of flank limitations for quartering Ukraine's Armed Forces (82.9%); e) results of the work of Kuchma-Gor Commission and implementation of the state Ukraine-NATO Cooperation Program (60% each). The events that had a negative effect are the following: a) threat of Ukraine's exclusion out of Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (80%); b) Ukraine's entry into the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (68.6%); c) Russian military actions in Chechnya (48.6%); d) NATO military actions against Yugoslavia (45.7%).
Answering the question "What should Ukraine's foreign policy goals be?", the experts gave first priority to "establishing conditions under which Ukraine could focus on its internal problems". This choice signifies strengthening of certain isolationistic beliefs among the foreign policy experts, which agrees with the growth of the popularity of the "neutral" status in contrast to the pro-NATO orientation (see above). Among other priorities there are "establishment and development of equal partnership relations with Russia", "intensification of partnership relations with the countries of CEE and Baltic states", "fulfilling the function of transportation corridor", "establishment of common security system", "cooperation within the GUUAM framework". Then follow "the search for essential assistance and investments from the West" and "establishing the conditions for the future accession to NATO". Such a hierarchy of priorities signifies that the experts are inclined to see Ukraine a regional and, to a certain extent, self-sustained country.
The State of Ukraine's Bilateral Relations with Foreign States and Alignments
The results of the assessments of the state of Ukraine's bilateral relations with foreign states were in general lower at the beginning of the year, but got better in the summer; they have not changed significantly, except for certain countries, in September and remained on the same level in December. In the second half of the year there have been some controversy and variations of assessments of the state of bilateral relations with many countries. Compared to the previous years, there has been some lowering of estimations of the state of Ukraine's bilateral relations with the strategically important Western partners, while the state of relations with the CIS countries has remained stable and even takes a turn for the better.
Same as earlier, Ukraine has the best relations with Poland. In the experts' opinion, Poland has been the first priority among other countries in terms of developing intensive and successful relations. Poland has also been pointed out as one of the four priority countries for Ukraine to develop relations with. It is rating the highest as to the state of bilateral relations (3.97 - 4.11 points out of 5 possible). Besides, Poland occupies the first position among the best allies of Ukraine. It stepped down one position and remains second among the countries that Ukraine can rely on during reforming its Armed Forces, while the US is recognized as the first. The experts' opinion, which remains stable from the beginning of the year, is that the Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with Poland has been very successful in terms of implementation of national interests of Ukraine. And it is Poland only that advocates Ukrainian interests in the region of Central and Eastern Europe and even before the European Union. Only Poland declared in full voice its readiness to postpone as long as possible the introduction of the visa regime at Ukraine's western border, which is required by the Western partners in the context of Poland's future accession to the EU. The success of these bilateral relations is based upon the active diplomatic services, as well as good personal relations of the two presidents of the countries.
Ukraine's bilateral relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan have received high appraisals from the Ukrainian experts for quite a long time. Georgia has 3.69-3.96 points out of five and Azerbaijan has 3.44-4 points. The GUUAM countries stand close to Poland as Ukraine's allies. The number of experts who view the GUUAM countries as Ukraine's allies has increased dramatically (about 50% over the year). So high a rating indicates that the experts attach great importance to Ukraine's relations with the GUUAM partners despite strategic ambiguity of and weak formal ties within the group.
The experts highly rated the bilateral relations between Ukraine and Germany (3.41-3.87 points). As a matter of fact, the experts' opinions diverged on Ukrainian-German relations. The 1999 rating was lower than the 1998 rating, and it began to rise in September only to plummet again later on. In spite of this fact, Germany is one of the four top-priority countries and is among the four countries with which Ukraine was developing successful relations. Germany has been the most important ally of Ukraine, second only to Poland and the US. The importance of Germany as a political and military ally equals that of Poland, with the US being the most important one. The 1997 predictions that the dynamics and efficiency of Ukrainian-German relations would go down after the center-left coalition with Gerhard Schroeder as chancellor came to power turned out to be true. During his visit to Ukraine in June 1999 Schroeder showed marginal interest in discussion of strategic issues such as European integration. He focused on local issues instead, such as reconsideration of German pledge with regard to construction of the nuclear reactors to be used after shutdown of the Chernobyl power plant. No political document was signed. All that drew the experts' attention who lower their rating of the bilateral relations between the two countries while recognizing the significance of Germany as the Ukrainian partner.
Then go Canada (3.49-3.67 points), Moldova (3.21-3.61), the Baltic states (3.22-3.68), and the USA (3.26-3.73).
The rating of bilateral relations with the US is constantly changing soaring in September, and plummeting in March, June, and December. Complexity of the relations accounts for these variations. Diplomatic successes in Ukrainian-American relations did not win high appreciation. It was higher in 1998 when the US held the fifth place after Poland, the UN, Germany, and NATO. The US is first of the four top-priority countries, but by late 1999 the assessments of efficiency and dynamics dropped by nearly 50%. At the end of the year the US was 22nd according to assessment of bilateral relations, while during the year the US has been number 10, and 13, and in 1997-1998 the US was among the top five countries. Possibly, American "friendly pressure" on the Ukrainian government to launch reforms accounts for fewer positive voices. Although the dynamics of the relations between Ukraine and the US kept up, the US became more overly instructive over time. Although American advice seems to be fair, this made Ukrainians distance themselves from the "instructors" and resulted in lower appraisals of the bilateral relations. However, the experts believe that the US has remained Ukraine's key partner in military reforms. They say that America is the most important ally of Ukraine, second only to Poland.
According to the experts' estimations Ukraine's relations with Russia and Belarus had been improving for some time since early 1999 and remained stable after that only to sour by the end of the year. This was especially true for Ukrainian-Belarus relations. Maybe we witnessed a late influence of the Ukrainian elections where the most influential candidate was rejecting Russia's practice (Chechnya) and renouncing the "Belarus' way". However, the aggravating problem of energy and oil supply, a disagreement over deployment of Russian tactical bombers in the Crimea, Russia's determination in building an alternative gas pipe through Belarus, and Russia's vocal claim for share in the best Ukrainian industrial enterprises to compensate for the Ukrainian debt were in all likelihood the major factors to impact the experts' decision. So, Russia comes as number 32-34 among 36 countries (as compared to number 30 in September), and Belarus shifted all the way to the bottom of the list (it is number 36, as compared to number 28-32 previously).
On the other hand, Russia's rating as a significant ally remains relatively high, with a temporary dip in June resulting from differences over Kosovo. In June and especially in December the experts believed that Russia could not be trusted in military construction. As stated above, the Eastward integration has been declining considerably, with dynamics in relations nearing zero. Despite the rising ratings of Ukrainian diplomatic successes in relations with Russia up to September and a minor fall in December, the evaluations of diplomacy in this direction are generally low.
The 1999 outsiders (the annual average lower than "3") are:
The countries of the Asian-Pacific region (2.24-2.86), Iran (2.38-3.0), Belarus (2.34-3.0), the Latin American countries (2.54-2.9), the Middle East and Gulf countries (2.62-3.0), Russia (2.74-3.11), Japan (2.75-3.11), Bulgaria (2.75-3.11), and Romania (2.79-3,05). The same countries but Bulgaria comprised the outsiders group in 1998, with relations with Iran standing out as exceptionally negative.
Russia followed by the USA has remained the first among the top-priority countries. The order is more symbolic than significant because the percentage difference is not statistically significant. Poland and Germany are number three and four. These four states keep a great distance from the rest, the difference between number four and five being 56.5%.
In December 1999 the experts placed Azerbaijan and France among less important countries. This group included Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Baltic States, and France in September; Great Britain and Israel in June; Belarus in March; and France in December of 1998. Relations with other countries were not considered as important as those with the cited countries.
As one can see, the priority of a country for Ukraine and the actual status of their bilateral relations are different for many countries. For instance, Ukraine's relations with Poland are the most dynamic and successful, with relations with Germany and the US lagging far behind. The experts placed Georgia next to the top-list countries with which relations were developing very successfully in 1999. While retaining its position as the country of priority for Ukraine Russia is far behind the leaders just as it was in 1998. Relations between Ukraine and Azerbaijan were progressing over 1999.
As stated above, the experts believe that Poland has been Ukraine's major ally. The US goes next, with Germany and the GUUAM countries trailing behind. Then go Russia, the Baltic States, and NATO. The CIS, EU, OSCE, and Council of Europe are of less importance. The North Atlantic Partnership Council and Western European Union have low ratings as Ukraine's allies.
In 1999 the views that Ukraine is destined to be an independent, non-bloc state were strengthened due to weakening integration processes Ukraine is part of. The pace of westward integration (with NATO, the EU, etc.) had been slowing down since early 1999, varying between "slow" and "no progress", whereas in 1998 its intensity was higher in between "moderate" and "slow". Failure of internal reforms contributing to the West's unwillingness to discuss future integration of Ukraine with the European Union, which became apparent during the Helsinki summit of the EU countries (December 1999) and preparations for it influenced Ukrainian experts' positions. One can state that the year of 1999 drew a bottom line under the unrealistic expectations of the considerable portion of Ukrainian elite with regard to fast adaptation by the new post-Soviet state of European standards.
Eastward integration (Russia, and the CIS) while moving by jolts was on the average even slower than westward integration. By the end of the year its pace was estimated as "zero", which is quite different from the previous estimates. The integration of Ukraine into Central and Eastern Europe was considered "slow" although until December its pace was faster than that of east- and westward integration processes. In spite of some slow-down in late 1999, Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region is the most dynamic, with pace being somewhere between "moderate" and "slow".
The appraisals of how well Ukrainian diplomacy was pursuing the national interests in 1999 remained stable with some fluctuations during the year. They were going down in March, and climbing in June-September to drop again in December. The highest grade to the Ukrainian diplomacy was awarded for development of Ukrainian-Polish relations (3.57-3.80 points), and for performance in the UN (3.19-3.86).
Relations with Germany were highly appraised (3.05-3.49), and relations with NATO were rated lower (2.84-3.36). In case of NATO the ratings of this direction were changing dramatically plummeting in March (NATO operation against Yugoslavia), rising in June, dropping in September unlike the ratings of other directions, and going up in December.
Then go the US 93.03-3.31), the Baltic States (2.94-3.26), Central and East European countries (2.92-3.35), international financial institutions (the IMF, World Bank, EBRD) - 2.73-3.34 points. Other directions won less than 3 points. The lowest ratings were given to the same directions as in 1998 as well as to the directions of relations with the European institutions (2.64-3.14), the countries of the Asian-Pacific region (2.0-2.84), the Middle East and Gulf countries (2.32-2.79), Western European Union (2.25-3.09), Russia (2.63-2.92), North European countries (2.77-3.13), and the CIS countries (2.76-3.13).
When answering this question the experts must have referred to their own idea of the "national interests of Ukraine" since the list of these interest is yet to be fully legitimized. The low rating of performance of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with Russia, one of Ukraine's most important partners, may be regarded characteristic. The diplomatic failure may have been stipulated by structural disproportions, strong energy dependence, and activity on the part of certain business agents. All in all, the medium rating of performance of Ukrainian diplomacy indicates that the foreign affairs service is relatively effective as compared with other ministries that have to deal with international relations.
Parameters and Desirable Spheres of Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO
The dynamics of westward integration of Ukraine with NATO and the EU was decreasing over the year, and, according to the experts, its pace was rather slow. NATO remained among Ukraine's allies, although it is not so important as it used to, and goes behind Poland, GUUAM, the US, Russia, Germany and the Baltic States. The rating might be affected by NATO's ignoring Ukrainian initiatives to partake in peacekeeping in Kosovo, and Ukraine's refusal to give its unconditional support to NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia.
The experts believe that one of the most significant spheres of cooperation between the Alliance and Ukraine is "creation of preconditions for Ukraine to join NATO" - number one, and "additional security guarantees to Ukraine" - number two. It is noteworthy that importance of cooperation in these spheres was decreasing over the year. Meanwhile, "harmonization of the political course in response to NATO's eastward expansion" gained some popularity shifting from position four to three, squeezing down "direct assistance in military reform to position four. "Sales of arms, special equipment, and military-technical services" was number five. "Participation in peace-keeping operations grew in popularity placing this sphere of cooperation as number six. "Harmonization of military-technical policy, support for the military-industrial complex" was perceived as highly important in June (place 3-5) only to fall all the way to position seven. "Joint development of conceptual foundation for the military policy" remained in its place eight. "Joint military exercises" became number nine after some rise in perceived importance in September, and "training of cadre" came as number ten. In early 1999 an idea that Ukrainian cooperation with NATO is unnecessary was registered among the low 6.3% of the experts. The experts' responses reflected the growing skepticism as to Ukraine's chances to join NATO and direct assistance of the Alliance in Ukrainian military reform. Meanwhile, the rating of "indirect" forms of cooperation of Ukraine and NATO, such as participation in peacekeeping operations, joint exercises, was growing. It became considerably higher after the culmination of the Kosovo crisis in mid-1999. The number of experts who believe that Ukraine's political course needs to be harmony with NATO's eastward expansion is growing, however, the means of harmonization are not defined.
According to the experts' opinion, the major proponents of Ukraine's integration with the West including accession to NATO are the right-wing parties in the Verkhovna Rada. The "prominent figures in financial and bank business", "mid-level businessmen", and "the centrist forces in the Rada" are less interested, but nonetheless influential. The group of "top generals in the Defense Ministry" lost some of its influence in 1999 as advocates for integration with the West. "Producers of arms and special equipment" can be regarded as interested in integration, although their stance depends on a particular situation. In June their influence plummeted fourfold, followed by a sevenfold growth in September only to fall threefold in December. As a result of the recent changes this group is believed to have little interest in integration for now. "Military officers", "heads of military education institutions", "leader of the military industrial complex" and other groups demonstrated minor interest in integration with the West, the experts say. In general the influence of these groups in 1999 as opposed to 1998 did not change.
Internal Factors of Security Policy
Presidential elections in Ukraine and discussions related to the election campaign became the most powerful factor of crafting security policy. It is noteworthy that the major presidential candidates subscribed to opposing views on national security and, therefore, the victory of one of them implied a choice of a strategic development path with appropriate adjustments of foreign and security policy.
Over 1998 there was registered a growing potential inclination to vote for the presidential candidate on October 31, 1999 who would support an overall economic integration of Ukraine with the West. On the contrary, the appeal of a candidate, who would emphasize a balanced development of Ukraine's relations both with Russia and the West, was on the wane. In the spring of 1999 the appeal of a pro-Western candidate dropped down considerably being offset by the latter orientation mentioned above. By the end of 1999 the latter orientation gained even more strength dominating any other orientation. The President who would urge Ukraine to join NATO as soon as possible won almost no support from the experts in December 1999, as opposed to March (the time when Leonid Kuchma was running for reelection). In the course of the election the candidate to gain more support would be the one stressing a balanced development of Ukraine's both with Russia and the West, just as the experts projected it would.
The issues of defense and Ukrainian armed forces, their capabilities to secure sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and the prospects of military reform, demonstrate similarity of challenges facing defense community to those of other governmental institutions, for instance, foreign policy institutions. On average the rating of military preparedness to carry out its missions is low or medium, while the military is perceived as poorly prepared for effective reforms.
When answering the question "How much should Ukraine rely on its own armed forces to provide its security?" the experts' opinions had the greatest amount of divergence and inconsistency as compared their answers to other survey questions. Throughout the year the proportion of "highly reliant" answers was fluctuating between 20 and 35% (with the peak in June); "reasonably reliant" - from 25 to 41% (the peak in September); "minimally reliant" - from 20 to 43% (with the peak in December).
Over the year less than 10% of the experts believed that Ukrainian military capabilities were "improving". However, in December this figure became 12% indicating a trend towards acceptance of positive changes. At the same time the number of experts who were saying that the military capabilities were "deteriorating" decreased significantly, while the number of those who believed they were "unchanged" was growing. It is possible what the experts meant was "unchanged" from an already low level of capabilities.
As before, economic factors dominated among other the factors of defense preparedness and capability (67.35% in 1999 as opposed to 72.38% in 1998). Political factors are perceived as of less importance (16.4%). In comparison with 1998, the perceived importance of military factors by the experts increased from 3.85% to 8.05% (in September it was as high as 13%). The instances of use of military force in solving ethno-political issues in Kosovo and Chechnya, geographically close to Ukraine, may have tipped the experts' opinion about military strength as an important security factor.
The experts' opinions about the countries Ukraine might count on in its military reforms were divided among the US (56.13%), Poland (31.45%), and Germany (29.58), to name the first three countries. The ratings of these three sates in 1999 are lower that those in 1998. Conversely, the number of those who believe that Ukraine can count on no other country in its military reform rose to 26.68%.
The assessment of the level of political elite's influence and confidence in the Ukrainian defense policy leadership went down in June, started to rise in September and lowered back in December. Confidence estimations are generally higher than those of influence level. At the same time the level of political elite's influence and confidence in the Ukrainian defense policy leadership is lower than the level of influence and confidence in the Ukrainian foreign policy leaders. The estimates range between "intermediate" and "low", nearing either one or another level.
Efficiency of the Verkhovna Rada in handling defense and state security issues was evaluated by the experts at about the same level as the Verkhovna Rada efficiency in the sphere of foreign policy: most experts evaluate it at either "low" or "zero" level. In December, about the same time the parliamentary crisis caused by the chronic inability of the VR to perform adequately its functions was impending, the number of "zero" estimations grew and reached 30% (with 64% of "low" estimations).
The average estimation of the conditions necessary to overcome the present stagnation within the MIC of Ukraine ranges between "insignificant" and "average" tending weakly upwards by the end of the year.
The experts remain quite skeptical at the perspective of establishing civil control over the Armed Forces and the MIC of Ukraine: while in March, June, and September the assessments ranged between "insignificant" and "average", in December they ranged between "average" and "zero".
Evaluating Ukraine's foreign and security policy, the experts remain generally skeptical and apprehensive. The year 1999 turned out to be sort of a Rubicon, which left behind unfulfilled hopes and groundless illusions of the Ukrainian elite. Foreign policy experts fully comprehend that Ukrainian diplomacy is doomed to fulfill one strategically important for the whole country goal, which is to avoid the default, economic collapse, and, thus, political marginalization. Certain issues that are considered essential by the European house neighbors remain at the policy periphery in Ukraine, which is focused on the problems of its survival and, thus, has critically narrow space left for its foreign policy initiatives and lacks the freedom of choice. In particular, the very perspectives of Ukraine's joining the European community (which is a declared goal of the state strategy in international relations) under these circumstances appear not to be the desired result of the goal-directed foreign policy, but rather a consequence of the build-up of a functionally valuable society, capable of accepting appropriate organizational culture.
As the result of the continuous social crisis, Ukrainian foreign policy is still sensitive. And on the eve of the new millennium this conclusion remains true.