For three years already (1997, 1998, 1999) the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine has conducted the expert assessment of condition and main trends of Ukraine's foreign policy. Below is the analysis of the poll carried out in September 1999 (the third one under the programme of Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine in 1999).

In all the polls, the analogous instruments were used, with certain addenda depending on the developments.

41 experts comprising four groups were involved in the poll:

1. Officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and employees of research structures rendering advice to state authorities (the National Institute for Strategic Studies, National Institute for Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Institute of World Economy and International Relations an National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, etc.) – 9 experts.
2. Deputies of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, first of all – members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and CIS and Committee for Defense and National Security, representing the left-wing-center-right-wing political spectrum – 11 experts.
3. Servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine ranking from lieutenant-colonel upwards, including officials of the Defense Ministry, professors and specialists of military academies and research centers, most of them having a scientific degree (military professional intellectual elite) – 11 experts.
4. Leading journalists specializing in international subjects and representing the most influential mass media. There are grounds to think that they have influence not only upon the public consciousness in the issues in question but also on the standpoint of the political elite (establishment) – 10 experts.

General Features of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

In June, due to NATO's involvement in Yugoslavia, experts specified the orientation at the "non-bloc" and/or "neutral status of Ukraine" as the most advisable one for our country – 53.3% compared to previous 32.5%, thus distancing themselves from NATO. The pro-NATO orientation comprised supporters of "Ukraine's accession to NATO independently from other countries – 36.7% and advocates of "accession to NATO together with CIS countries" – 3.3% (40% in the aggregate). However, the situation changed back, and at present there is a balance between the pro-NATO and neutral orientations, with 43.6% and 46.2% accordingly. Taking into account the alternative of " accession to NATO together with CIS countries" (indicated by 5.1% of experts), the orientation at "accession to NATO" is somewhat ahead of others, as usual. Since early 1999, experts have constantly indicated as a possible option "Ukraine's accession to a military alliance of CIS countries as an alternative to accession to NATO" (5.1% in September) that was hardly mentioned last year.

Since the beginning of the year, there is a high probability of emerging threat to Ukraine, in experts' opinion. Tension was somewhat decreased in June, though temporarily. The same number of experts as in early 1999 (17%) believe that there is a direct threat to territorial integrity of Ukraine (in June – 6.7%). Almost half of the experts – 46.2% (in June – 50%) continue to think that it can emerge at any moment. The view of "there is no threat, but it should be expected in 1-2 or 3-5 years" is shared by 5.1% and 7.7% of experts, essentially differing from the previous assessments (in June – 6.7% and 13.3% accordingly). Less than 1/3 of experts – 23.1% (in June – 23.3%) believe that "there is no threat and there are all preconditions for preventing it".

According to Ukrainian experts, September saw cessation of the constant worsening of the state of international security in Europe, that has been taking place since early 1999. However, pessimists, thinking that it continues to worsen, still prevail (48.6%, in June – 86.7%) over optimists, thinking that it is improving (18.9%, in June – 6.7%). These assessments are close to usual fluctuations observed in the previous years. Like in early 1999, about 1/3 of experts (32.4%, in June – 6.7%) think that the state of international security in Europe has remained "unchanged". The state of international security of Ukraine is assessed by most experts as "unchanged" (63.2%). Against the background of fluctuating assessments of the state of international security in Europe, the assessment regarding Ukraine remains at the same level, with general level of security in Europe and of Ukraine coinciding in general. Most experts continue to indicate the "low" level of the international assurances of Ukraine's security extended to Ukraine by other countries. To somewhat lower extent Ukraine has to follow the lead of other states or groupings submitting itself to their orders or expectations, and to the same extent as previously it can rely on those countries as allies.

June saw the increased significance of political factors in ensuring Ukraine's international security, but at present according to experts, economic factors have resumed their leading role. Experts regard other factors, such as military, ecological, socio-cultural ones, as insignificant.

Economic factors continue to be the most significant in ensuring defensive capacity of Ukraine, with political ones being insignificant. Accordingly, under the current economic situation, experts indicate further worsening of combativity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, though to a lesser extent than before. The extent, to which Ukraine can rely on its Armed Forces has increased essentially, being almost equal to "intermediate", while ranging between "intermediate" and "low" before.

In June, the intensity of international processes in which Ukraine was involved increased noticeably in all trends, except the eastern one, and in September – in all trends except the western one. The process of Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region (BSEC) did not weaken either being the highest among other trends, on the whole its assessment moved further from "slow" to "intermediate". Ukraine's integration towards the region of Central and Eastern Europe further continued. There again was a wave of fluctuation in the eastern direction (Russia, CIS) from slowing down in June to reviving in September, whereas there was an opposite picture in the western direction (NATO, EU, etc.) As a result of all those changes, experts assessed the state of Ukraine's integration in the aforementioned directions as approaching to "slow", while in the western direction it was assessed lower accordingly fluctuating between "slow" and "zero". There was a similar situation in June when the same assessment was given to the eastern direction in place of the western one.

Experts consider "leftists in the Supreme Rada" and "politicians of pro-Russian orientation" to be the main advocates of integration with Russia up to uniting into a coherent state among the Ukrainian political elite. A less significant but still weighty group here is "socially destitute strata of population" The weight of "industrialists from Ukrainian-Russian groups" has constantly received different assessments, that in general does not affect its rating significantly. Among supporters of this trend experts also included "regional leaders of the East and the South". The significance of "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented at cooperation with Russia" remains almost at the same level. "Officers of the Armed Forces" and any other groups are not considered to be essentially interested in integration in the above-mentioned direction.

Experts consider the right-wing deputies at the Supreme Rada to be first among supporters of Ukraine's integration with the West up to accession to NATO. To a much less extent interested are "leaders of financial and banking business", "centrists in the Supreme Rada" and "medium-level businessmen". "Weaponry and special equipment producers" are considered to be either interested or not depending on the situation. Their significance in June dropped almost four times, and in September it increased again almost 7 times. Since the beginning of the year, the group of 'top generals and Defense Ministry leadership" has lost its significance as supporters of integration with the West. In experts' opinion, "officers of the Armed Forces", "heads of military educational institutions", "leaders of MIC enterprises" and representatives of other groups demonstrate little interest in the integration westwards.

Experts' assessment of Ukraine's foreign policy from the standpoint of its stability, deliberateness and predictability did not go down, and as for deliberateness and predictability they even increased a bit compared to June. On the whole, the assessment in all three indicators fluctuates approximately at the same level – between "low" and "intermediate", with deliberateness assessment being a bit higher than others.

State of Bilateral Relations with Foreign States and Alignments

Russia is in the second position (following USA) among top-priority countries. Experts indicated Germany and Poland among the next four priority states. Among the less priority countries, this time experts also indicated Belarus, Kazakstan, Baltic states, and France. In June, this group included Great Britain and Israel, in March – Belarus, in December 1998 – France. Relations with other countries are deemed comparatively less significant.

Ukraine enjoys the most intensive and successful development of relations with, first of all, Poland and, at a significant distance, Russia followed by USA and Germany. This time, among such countries experts, in addition to Georgia and Azerbaijan, also identified Kazakstan. Then come Turkey, Baltic countries, Moldova, and China. In summer, there was a general increase in the estimations of bilateral relationship of Ukraine and success of Ukrainian foreign policy. Except certain countries (Slovakia – great decrease, Sweden, Finland, Armenia – increase), assessments did not change significantly. There was a slight improvement in assessment of relations with USA. Experts highly appraised efforts taken by the Ukrainian diplomacy in the relationship with USA – after Poland, UN, Germany and countries of Central and Eastern Europe in general. Being among priority countries for Ukraine, USA held 10^th position in September as for the state of bilateral relationship, while in summer it was on 13^th position (before it was permanently among top five countries). At the same time, USA remains the major ally of Ukraine, especially in the military and political dimension.

Estimations of Ukraine's relationship with Russia and Belarus have not changed and remain at the same level, though they seemed to be improving since the beginning of the year. Experts assessed Russia to be on the 32^nd position among 36 countries (previously – 30^th position) and Belarus – on 32^nd position (previously – 28^th). Russia's significance as an ally, especially in the military and political field, somewhat increased in September after the drop in June. These estimations also coincide with deepening of integration processes in the eastern direction. Success of the Ukrainian diplomacy in relationship with Russia was assessed higher than in June as well.

Like previously, Ukraine has the best relations with Poland. Experts identified it as the first country most successfully and intensively developing relations with Ukraine and included it into the first permanent "four" priority countries, with which Ukraine should develop relations at the first place (in that group Poland occupies the fourth position that does not essentially differ from the first three ones). Likewise, Poland was given the highest assessment as to the state of bilateral relationship (3.97 points of 5-point scale; in summer – 4.03 points). Only as a country on which Ukraine can rely in reforming its Armed Forces Poland cedes to USA being in the second position. In bilateral relations with Poland the Ukrainian diplomacy continues to realize Ukrainian national interests most successfully, according to experts' assessment.

After Poland, in September, experts gave especially high estimation to Ukraine's relationship with Germany – 3.87 points (2^nd position), which used to be rather highly appraised previously as well (3.54 points, 7^th position since the beginning of the year). Germany has been constantly mentioned among four priority countries. Experts gave much higher estimation to diplomacy in this direction as well – after the relations with Poland and UN. Following Poland and GUUAM, Germany, along with the Baltic states, remains an important ally for Ukraine, and in the military and political sphere it has even surpassed Poland.

After that, for a long time, experts have given rather high estimations to Ukraine's bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan (3.77 points) and Georgia (3.77 points). GUUAM, alongside with Poland, is noticeably distinguished among the allies of Ukraine. Then, at a considerable distance, comparatively high estimations were given to the state of bilateral relations with the Baltic countries, Canada, Turkey, Sweden, Moldova, and USA (3.68-3.62 points). In June, those were Moldova (3.64 points), Slovakia (3.59 points), and close to them – Greece, Germany, Canada, Kazakstan, Baltic countries (3.57-3.52).

The outsider countries this time comprise Iran, Asian-Pacific countries, countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, countries of Latin America, Belarus (2.71-2.92 points); a bit higher are Romania (3.05), Russia, Japan, and Norway (3.11-3.13).

In June, the same countries, except some of them, were indicated as outsiders: countries of the Asian Pacific region, countries of Latin America, countries of Middle East and Persian Gulf, Iran, and Armenia (2.83-2.86 points); a bit higher were Russia, Romania, France, Belarus, and Japan (2.90-3.00).

Since December, there has again been a general increase in assessment of successfulness of the Ukrainian diplomacy at international arena regarding realization of Ukraine's national interests. The only exception is relationship with NATO, for which estimations have worsened (3.19 points), although they increased in June. The Ukrainian diplomacy continues to receive the highest estimation for development of relations with Poland (3.77 points). Like in June, Poland is followed with high estimations by UN (3.66), Germany (3.49) countries of Central and Eastern Europe in general (3.35), international finance institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD with 3.34 points), USA (3.31), Baltic countries (3.26), Western European countries (3.26). The lowest (less than 3 points) assessment was given to the same trends of relations as in June, except WEU (3.09) and European structures (3.14): Russia (2.92), countries of Asian Pacific region (2.84), countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf (2.79), countries of Central and South America (2.79).

Poland continues to be the main ally for Ukraine. Next to Poland this time, experts specified the GUUAM countries followed by Germany, Baltic states and USA. Russia, in experts' opinion, is a less significant ally. NATO's rating of an ally has somewhat decreased, whereas CIS and the Council of Europe have improved their ratings. OSCE and EU are slightly indicated as allies, while CEAP and WEU were not mentioned at all. In the military reform, according to experts, Ukraine, like previously, can rely, first of all, on cooperation with USA, Germany and Poland, then – Germany and Russia, the latter having its rating restored again. Many experts think that there are no countries on which Ukraine can rely in reforming its Armed Forces.

Ukraine's having to follow the lead of other countries or alignments somewhat decreased compared to June when it had increased, being now close to "intermediate". And the extent to which Ukraine has to rely on its allies in realization of its foreign policy objectives increased again after decreasing in summer, now fluctuating between "intermediate" and "low".

The estimations of effectiveness of the Supreme Rada activities regarding issues of defense, national security and foreign policy decreased essentially in June, and in September they are close to "low".

Parameters and Desirable Trends of Cooperation with NATO

In June, the number of advocates of the pro-NATO orientation reduced considerably, while supporters of the "non-bloc and/or neutral status of Ukraine" prevailed. In September, the orientation at "accession to NATO" regained its position, and now the two alternatives counterbalance one another, with the pro-NATO orientation slightly prevailing, as always.

However, Ukraine's relationship with NATO deteriorated in other indices. There was a decrease of intensity of the process of Ukraine's integration westwards – with NATO, EU, which had increased in June, though in general experts estimated it as too "slow". NATO remains among the allies of Ukraine, though not as significant one as Russia. In September, the Ukrainian diplomacy received lower estimation for relationship with NATO than previously (from 3.30 points in June to 3.19 in September).

Like previously, among the top priority trends of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO experts indicated the"creation of preconditions for Ukraine's prospective accession to NATO" and "providing additional security guarantees to Ukraine" (they share 1st-2^nd positions). The trend of "coordination of policies in relation to NATO's eastward enlargement" continues to be topical. There is an essentially increased urgency of "joint exercises" (it shares 3^rd-4^th positions together with the previous trend). 5th position is held by the necessity of "joint development of concepts of defense policies". The trends of "trade in arms, special machinery and services of military and technical purpose" and "direct assistance in realization of the military reform" continue to share 6^th-7^th positions respectively. The necessity of "coordination of military and technical policies, support of MIC" and "participation in peacekeeping operations", having sharply increased their significance in June (3th-5^th positions), are again at the bottom of the list (8th-9^th positions) as to their significance. The last trend, like previously, is "personnel training" (8^th-10^th). Since the beginning of the year, there has been an indicative though insignificant opinion that Ukraine's cooperation with NATO is unnecessary.

Internal Determinants of Security Policy

In general, the indices of the level of influence and confidence of elite leaders on the officials in charge of foreign and defense policies of Ukraine began to increase again, whereas they decreased in June. There was a noticeable increase of confidence in the officials in charge of foreign policy, being almost close to "intermediate" and even prevailing over the level of influence of elites, although the previous estimations of confidence used to be lower than those of influence. They are all fluctuating between "intermediate" al "low".

Most experts think that divergences between regions in their attitude to foreign policy continue "to become less essential" or "remain unchanged", i.e. without particular deepening.

Presidential Elections

During 1998, there was a growing potential support of a candidate for presidency who would stand for all-round economic integration of Ukraine with the West, while support of the candidate standing for balanced development of Ukraine's relationship both with Russia and the West was decreasing. In early 1999, the support of a candidate standing for Ukraine's integration with the West reduced considerably and became equal to that of a bivectoral orientation. The latter has by now increased and dominates among the others. A runner standing for Ukraine's earliest accession to NATO would now collect practically no votes at all, in contrast to March. Instead, in September the support of a candidate standing for "independent" foreign policy and non-bloc status of Ukraine has increased twofold (being still twice lower that the above-mentioned indices).

Main Objectives of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

The basic objectives of Ukraine's foreign policy could conditionally be divided into three groups (arranged according to average estimation); this arrangement has remained since early 1999:

1. now, like previously, experts consider the "creation of conditions under which Ukraine would not have to worry about the state of its security and be able to focus on its domestic problems" to be the most important objective of today;
2. the "creation of a comprehensive security system, which would exclude war as a means of resolution of international conflicts" has become especially topical of late (previously, it was in the 5^th position, i.e. among the less important objectives);

Instead, the necessity of "establishment and development of partnership relations with Russia" has somewhat lost its significance, being now in the 5^th position (previously – among the most important objectives);

Important, though to a smaller extent, in experts' opinion, are the following objectives:

3. "deepening of partnership with countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic states;
4. "function of a transport corridor North-South, East-West;
5. "establishment and development of partnership relations with Russia";

Significance of "creating preconditions for Ukraine's prospective accession to NATO" has decreased, too, being now in the 10th position (previously –6th);

6. "deepening of partnership with CIS countries"
7. "developing cooperation in the framework of GUUAM"
8. obtaining of large-scale aid and investments from the Western countries";
9. achievement of recognition and strengthening of Ukraine as a regional leader of countries of Central and Eastern Europe;
10. "creating preconditions for Ukraine's prospective accession to NATO";
11. initiative of further disarmament, comprehensive and ultimate ban of nuclear tests;
12. strengthening of missile technologies non-proliferation regime;
13. experts split (50/50) whether the "UN reform" is the most or less important objective;
14. most experts believe that "development of cooperation with the "new nuclear powers" (India, Pakistan) is a secondary objective.