The Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine has been carrying out an expert estimation of the state and basic trends of Ukraine's foreign policy since the beginning of 1997 within the framework of the permanent program "Monitoring Foreign and Security Policy of Ukraine".

The expert polls are conducted four times a year – in March, June, September and December. All the polls operate with the same instruments, with certain addenda, depending on the latest course of events.

The group of experts comprised specialists of four categories totaling to 40-44 persons:

1. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and employees of research structures rendering advise to state structures (the National Institute for Strategic Studies; the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; the Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine, etc.).
2. Deputies of the Supreme Rada (parliament) of Ukraine, primarily members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS and the Committee for Defense and State Security. They represent all the political spectrum: left-wing, center and right-wing.
3. Servicemen within the Armed Forces of Ukraine having the rank not lower than lieutenant-colonel, including officials from the Ministry of Defense, professors and specialists of military higher educational institutions and research centers, most of them having scientific degrees (military professional intellectual elite).
4. Leading journalists who specialize in international issues and represent the most influential mass media. There are grounds to presume that they influence not only the formation of public opinion, but also the standpoint of political elite (establishment).

From 1997, among the experts' preferences there were ear-marked two basic alternative foreign-policy orientations. One of them envisages the inclination towards Ukraine's accession to NATO, the other one – recognition of advantages of a "neutral and/or non-aligned status of Ukraine". Alongside with this, during two years the popularity of the "pro-NATO" orientation not just remained rather high, but also had been growing to some extent. As a general, at an average, the NATO-oriented experts made about one half of the polled (46-51%), while in the end of 1998 an overwhelming majority (68.6%) spoke for Ukraine's accession to NATO.

The variant of Ukraine's accession to NATO together with the CIS countries, which is least probable but still included in the questionnaire, can be regarded as a compromise but eventually pro-NATO one. As a general, the share of adherents thereof made not more than 2-7%, except September, 1998 when it became two times as great (up to 15.4%). Taking into account this variant, we may conclude that the idea of expedience of "Ukraine's accession to NATO" has been dominating during last two years.

Among other orientations, only the above-mentioned orientation at "Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status" is worth attention. As a general, it was statistically weaker than the former one. However from the beginning of 1997 this orientation gradually grew strong (from 28.6% to 43.6%). In the beginning of 1998 it even counterbalanced (according to the number of adherents) the orientation at "Ukraine's accession to NATO". But since that time its weight began to decrease again and in the end of the year it was even beneath the initial level (25.7%).

As a possible alternative, "Ukraine's accession to a military alliance of the CIS countries" was examined. As well as in the case with Ukraine's accession to NATO together with the CIS countries, the experts deemed this variant least probable and even sometimes did not point out probability of such a scenario at all. The same concerned any other alternatives suggested among a number of questions.

General Features of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

Characterizing the foreign policy and security of Ukraine through 1997-1998 according to a number of indices, the experts generally gave the lowest estimations in the beginning of the year and highest ones – in the end of the year.

Most experts think that there is no immediate threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity. However from time to time a tense expectation of emergence thereof at any moment was expected. The anxiety was most clear in March, 1997 and June, 1998. A complete absence of danger for Ukraine's territorial integrity and presence of conditions to prevent it were constantly pointed out by less than one third (sometimes even less than one fourth) of experts involved into the poll.

Accordingly, a greater share of experts was inclined to think that there was a threat to the state's territorial integrity or there was a high probability of emergence thereof in the future. According to expert estimations, the greatest extent of feeling of an immediate threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity was registered in March, 1998 (40.5% of the polled).

We should note that the perception of presence or absence of a threat to territorial integrity of the state was characterized with a noticeable instability of expert estimations. The attitude of the polled experts to the issue of external threats varied in the following mode: admittance of overt threats began to decrease as a whole, but expectation thereof in the future stayed, though such threats became more remote in temporal dimension – for 1-2 or 3-5 years. An increase of the number of those thinking that such threats may emerge in 3-5 years was registered (from 7.3% in December, 1997 to 21.6% in December, 1998).

In the end of 1998, as well as in the end of 1997, the experts expressed a more calm, rather optimistic estimation as regards the condition of Ukraine's international security compared to their estimations made during the year. Probably, such an increase of optimism in the end of the year was caused by the fact that the worst expectations did not come to life in the course of the year.

In 1997, the experts pointed out positive changes in the condition of Ukraine's international security in Europe, in particular, compared to the beginning of 1997. However since then, during 1998, the experts did not stated any essential improvement of European security. With certain fluctuations, they were inclined to recognize that the situation remained unchanged. Against this background, the estimations of the state of Ukraine's international security ranged with a certain synchronism in accordance with the estimations of security in Europe, but at an essentially lower level. Thus, under recognition of the fact of improvement of the condition of security in Europe in 1997, the condition of international security in Ukraine was characterized as unchanged. In turn, in 1998, under determination of European security's condition as unchanged, from 17.1% to 41% of experts stressed that the condition of Ukraine's national security generally got worse. Only in the end of the year most experts pointed out the identity of situations in both aspects, i.e. an absence of essential changes regarding both the condition of security in Europe and the condition of international security in Ukraine.

The estimation of the level of international security guarantees given to Ukraine by other countries had a bent for growth during 1997. Having decreased a bit in the beginning of 1998, it remained higher than in 1997 up to December, 1998. However this level is by no means sufficient, ranging between "intermediate" and "low" marks. To a greater extent than in 1997, foreign policy of Ukraine was influenced by other states' orders and intentions that contradict Ukraine's national interests. The situation looked still more threatening, whereas Ukraine, from the point of view of the experts, evidently lacked trustworthy allies it could rely on.

The main role in provision of Ukraine's international security (at least during the last two years when the monitoring was carried out) constantly belonged to economic factors. The only exception is the situation of September, 1998, when political determinants were called crucial (probably owing to expectation that after the election of Oleksandr Tkachenko to the post of Head of the Supreme Rada a new stage of struggle between the main political forces at the parliament would take place, that would intensify the opposition of branches of power). The importance of political factors had been pointed out by the experts before, but to an extent less than that of economic ones.

The set of issues regarding international and national security of Ukraine has disclosed a rather interesting distribution of estimations and opinions of the experts. The studying of their response to the basic aspects of national and European security throughout two years allows to draw preliminary conclusions regarding the development and functioning of political thought and social consciousness of the share of Ukrainian society generally named "foreign-political community", which has an immediate relation to the formation, discussion and critical analysis of Ukraine's foreign policy. An interesting element of this consciousness consists in a certain gap between the actual economic condition of the state and society and particular ideas and suggestions reflected by the quarterly polls' return.

The contents of divergence between the ideas and realities consisted in the following:

1. The lag of estimations of Ukraine's internal dependence on the policy (orders and/or expectations) of other states and alignments from the actual situation related to transformation of external financial and economic dependence into a political one. The problem is that from spring, 1998 the Ukrainian government was under a permanent threat of default. This default (bankruptcy of executive authority) could actually happen at any moment if the government would fail to find means for current servicing of external debts. Under such circumstances, only direct financial aid of international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank) or immediate financial assistance of industrially developed states-donors, which generally determine the policy of international financial institutions, could save the state from default. It is significant that the total expert estimation of the extent of Ukraine's dependence on other states and alliances, which had been lower than "intermediate" level during 1997, began to get close to the indices of a great external dependence in 1998 to an insignificant extent, though persistently.

In this regard, evident was the effect of two different phenomena (or trends). On the one hand, it was an immediate and remnant influence of national liberation ideology and propaganda of independence and sovereignty at the state level for several years. The ideological factors of national-liberation, anti-colonial direction accomplished the realizing by the experts of the fact that the imperfect economic policy had put the state on the edge of a new non-formal dependence, which is not marked by imperial or colonial attributes and can turn out to be not less grave and effective than direct control from abroad or direct dictatorship. On the other hand, it becomes evident that not only the so called "foreign-policy community", but also an overwhelming majority of Ukrainian bureaucratic, scientific and academic elite have not realized the deepness, possible effects and long-lasting aftermath of the country's economic decline. In particular, this regards the reasons for and effects of the new stage of crisis, which injured the country's economy in summer-autumn, 1998. To a great extent, the still inadequate perception of economic, social and structural parameters of the crisis in Ukraine was influenced by official inconsistent and wrong explanations stressing that the decline of the Ukrainian currency was caused first of all by the Russian financial crisis and there were not objective reasons for further economic decline in Ukraine.

2. An indirect sign of the strengthening of Ukraine's external asymmetric dependence on leading states was contained in answers to the question of to what extent Ukraine could rely on its allies in the fulfillment of foreign-policy goals. The number of those stressing that this extent was "low" and "nought" (together) increased from 36.8% to 56.7% in the course of the year. At the same time, the share of those deeming this extent "high" or "intermediate" (together) decreased from 63.2% to 43.2%.

As well as with regard to provision of external, international security, economic determinants were deemed crucial for provision of Ukraine's defense capacities. Alongside with that, the experts deemed political and social factors (conditions of service within the Armed Forces, etc.) to be much less important that economic ones. Against this background, according to the experts, the authority of the army in society is actually unimportant. At the same time, the only positive feature of public opinion we can obviously allude to in this context still consists in the fact that the society is most confident in the Armed Forces compared to other state institutions. A second-rank role in the provision of Ukraine's defense capacity, as well as international security thereof, is currently played by purely military, social-cultural and other determinants. Accordingly, as the experts think, under current economic situation the Armed Forces' readiness keeps on getting worse. Alongside with this, the extent, to which Ukraine has to rely on its own Armed Forces, generally increased from the beginning of 1998, but, taking into account its ranging between the low and intermediate levels, it has not altered essentially compared to 1997. If we examine the determinants of defense capacity in connection with possible reliance on allies' assistance, under the aggravation of economic crisis it looks fully logical to strengthen orientation at one's own forces and decrease dependance on partners' help. We may assume that continuation of economic troubles in the state shall cause a further weakening of allied assistance from other countries and strengthening of the country's relative isolation trend. The signs of development of the situation in this direction were reflected in experts' answers to the question concerning the condition of Ukraine's participation in European and sub-regional integration processes.

Characterizing Ukraine's participation in integration processes (of various regional extents and directions) as a whole, in 1998 the experts stressed an essentially less intensity thereof than in 1997. The only exception was the Black Sea region (activities of the newly created or rather eventually institutionalized Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization). According to the experts, in this respect the process of Ukraine's integration has been lately periodically intensified, though sometimes got slow. In our opinion, there are no sufficient grounds to stress that there is a certain firm tendency in this regard. In particular, the process of the Black Sea integration (both in practice and in experts' perception) going to slower in the end of 1998. The expert estimation in this regard, which previously was higher than at other directions, decreased almost to the "slow" level.

In the course of 1998, Ukraine's integration towards the region of Central-Eastern Europe had been estimated as one close to "slow", the condition of development of integration ties in the Western direction (with NATO, the EU, etc.) deemed a bit more intensive.¹ Alongside with that, the fluctuations of estimations during the year were relatively insignificant and short-lasting. Some waves of changes, though also more slow than in 1997, were registered only in the Eastern direction (Russia, the CIS). Alongside with that, unlike 1997, in 1998 such fluctuations (in the Eastern direction) were rather independent from the dynamics of estimation of Ukraine's ties in the Western direction. Therefore, the variant of a "zero effect game" did not work any more.

An essential increase of estimation of intensity of the Eastern integration process in March (to the highest level among other directions) was replaced by a sharp decrease thereof in June, a repeated increase in September and decrease in December. Such fluctuations of estimations reflected the actual condition of relations between Ukraine and Russia and other post-Soviet republics. As a whole, there are grounds for characterizing of this process as disintegration between Ukraine and Russia, as well as between Ukraine and the CIS. In particular, irrespective of the signing of the Treaty on Economic Cooperation between Ukraine and Russia and Bilateral Program of Economic Relations Development for 1998-2007 by the presidents of the two countries on 27 February 1998, the level of Ukraine's eastward integration, with only exception of the March (1998) estimations was evaluated as one ranging between "slow" and "nought" marks. Thus, it was regarded by the experts as one essentially more low than integration in any other direction.

As well as previously, in the course of 1998 the development of Ukrainian-Russian relations had been characterized with an essential contradictiveness. In the end of 1997 – beginning of 1998, the Administration of the President of Ukraine attempted to heighten the level of contacts between the supreme officials of the two countries under the motto of "strategic partnership". In the end of February, 1998, the first official state visit of the President of Ukraine to the Russian Federation took place. However the activation of contacts at the presidential level did not result in a new mode of Ukrainian-Russian relations. The instability of such relations was once more confirmed in the aftermath of the Russian financial-economic crisis of 17 August 1998. The permanent diseases of President B.Yeltsin and occasional shifts of officials at the government and President's Administration also contributed to the instability of interstate relations, which actually remain too distant from those of "strategic partnership" and sometimes suffer destabilization under the influence of particular personal or group economic and political interests. A testimony of the ambivalence and instability of the development of such relations was the evident viciousness of the process of ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership of 31 May 1997 at the Russian parliament. As regards the CIS (as a sub-regional international organization), 1998 was marked by an increase of perception thereof as a short-lasting, provisional structure deprived of any prospects. At the same time, in Ukraine there became more and more often the statements that under the CIS Charter Ukraine is not a member of this structure.²

At the same time, in 1998, the attitude of the main political parties and movements of the two countries to Ukrainian-Russian relations became to some extent more clear. Thus, in Russia, an overtly hostile position regarding Ukraine was occupied by Liberal-Democratic Party led by Volodymyr Zhirinovsky and Yuriy Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, leader of "Otechestvo" (Fatherland) movement and one of the possible candidates at the future elections of the President of the Russian Federation due to whom the ratification of the Ukrainian-Russian Treaty of 1997 at the Council of the Russian parliament was postponed on 27 January 1999. At the same time, there was registered an intensification of cooperation between not only the leadership of Communist parties of Ukraine and the Russian Federation, but also the leaders of the main factions and movements at both parliaments as a whole. In this regard, illustrative was the efficiently propagandized visit of a Ukrainian parliamentary delegation headed by Oleksandr Tkachenko to the Federal Meeting of the Russian Federation in December, 1998, which resulted in the ratification of the basic Ukrainian-Russian Treaty by the State Duma – the lower house of the Russian Parliament – on 25 December.

In the left wing of the Ukrainian political elite spectrum, there are certain groups, which proclaim themselves (or, at least, enjoy a reputation of) adherents of integration with Russia and Belarus. Alongside with that, from time to time, in the mass media of Ukraine, at initiative of particular right-wing political parties there were launched campaigns against adherents of USSR restoration and politicians of the pro-Russian orientation. Therefore the questionnaire of the expert poll conducted during 1997-1998 included a question: "Which of Ukrainian nationals are today the main adherents of integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state?"

Compared to 1997, the answers of the experts to this question did not change essentially. As before, the experts mentioned as most concerned about the mentioned variant the "politicians of pro-Russian orientation" and the "left-wing deputies at the Supreme Rada" (1 and 2 positions of 8 possible answers). Among other groups of influence, which, in opinion of the polled, are concerned about uniting with Russia, the experts kept on mentioning "entrepreneurs of Ukrainian-Russian groups" and "socially hapless strata of population". Besides, among the adherents of the mentioned political trend, the experts mentioned "regional leaders of the East and the South of Ukraine" whose significance had been growing in the course of the year but suddenly sharply decreased in December. Further, the experts pointed out the group of "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented at cooperation with Russia", whose significance almost remained unchanged during the year. As regards "officers with the Armed Forces" and any other groups, the experts almost did not mention them among the main adherents of Ukraine's "complete integration" with Russia.

Among the main adherents of integration with the West, up to Ukraine's accession to NATO, the experts first of all mentioned the "right-wing deputies at the Supreme Rada". Despite certain shifts in the correlation of the groups concerned about westward integration during the year, their general placement according to poll results was the same as in 1997. Besides the indicated group, the experts deemed the following groups concerned about integration with the West, though to an essentially less extent: "leaders of financial and banking business", "centrists at the Supreme Rada", "middle-level businessmen" and "the General staff of the Ministry of Defense". To some insignificant extent, in this regard there were also mentioned "producers of arms and special technics" (the conditional weight of this group of influence essentially decreased in the end of 1998) and "leaders of MIC enterprises". The significance of this group made 10.8% in December and 7.9% in September, 1998. "Officers with the Armed Forces of Ukraine", "heads of military educational institutions" and representatives of other groups were not regarded by experts as ones expressing a great concern about integration in the indicated direction.

Commenting on the results of alternative questions connected with the attitude of the main groups of influence to integration with the West and Russia, one should keep in mind that in the actual political life of Ukraine, unlike in the questionnaire, the two alternative positions can hardly be seen in their extreme forms.

If we take into account the particular actual groups of influence stressing the support of reintegration with Russia, the only force overtly speaking for Ukraine's reunification with Russia is the parliamentary group "Communists for USSR Restoration" (25-30 persons headed by V.Moiseyenko) within the Communist Party of Ukraine. This motto is also supported by some small non-parliamentary movements like "Communists-Bolsheviks", "Slavic Unity", "Ukrainian-Russian Alliance", etc. If we allude to programs and public speeches of the leaders of parliamentary left-wing parties, the thesis of integration with Russia, in a form of establishment of a "brotherly alliance of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus" is contained in the programs of Communist Party and the left-radical Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. Oleksandr Tkachenko, the Head of the XIV convocation Supreme Rada and non-formal leader of Peasants' Party of Ukraine has also repeatedly stressed support of this idea. In particular, his further more loud declarations of possibility of Ukraine's soonest accession to the Russian-Belorussian political alliance are interpreted as a beginning of a public campaign aimed at nominating himself on the eve of presidential elections, which are to take place on 31 October 1999.

However one should keep in mind that in most cases the idea of "alliance of the three brotherly Slavic peoples" is exploited by the left-wing forces for purely pragmatic purposes – to use the impacts of social discontent and related feelings of humiliated dignity, which act in social consciousness as a sublimation of the destruction of the former superpower, the USSR, the population whereof enjoyed a certain minimum of social guarantees. Actually, in no of the three Slavic republics of ex-USSR left-wing forces are in power. This circumstance, taking into account the fact that they are outsiders, makes the idea of reintegration non-expedient from a purely practical viewpoint (due to the "opposition" of the left wing to oligarchy regimes in the indicated countries). Thus, in political space of Ukraine, the debates around "reintegration with Russia" are of a rather propagandistic character and supported by both the left-wing and right-wing forces with an aim of political mobilization of electorate. It is clear that under aggravation of economic crisis and poverty of population the reintegration ideas of the left wing may acquire not only propagandistic, but also an entirely actual character.

As regards the ideas of integration with the West, up to Ukraine's accession to NATO, this issue has also acquired a specific interpretation in current political life of Ukraine. From 1996, initially in small voice and further more loudly, the Administration of President Kuchma has been proclaiming the aim of Ukraine's future "complete integration" into "European and Euro-Atlantic structures". At the same time, though during 1998 the executive authority required that the European Union should grant Ukraine a status of an associate member, its representatives perfectly recognized Ukraine's complete non-correspondence to the criteria of European integration. Moreover, the aggravation of economic crisis in Ukraine in 1998 – beginning of 1999 meant an objective growth of the distance between Ukraine and Central European states, which are being regarded as potential candidates for membership in the EU. Therefore, the insisting on Ukraine's further integration into Europe without appropriate measures to adjust economic and social conditions in the country to European standards shall only lead to disorientation of the society, foreign partners and the bodies in charge of foreign affairs.

A different situation was formed during 1997-1998 in relations between Ukraine and NATO. As a whole, the development thereof can be deemed rather successful. Due to various geopolitical, internal and home-policy reasons, executive authorities of Ukraine stress that under current circumstances the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO "is not raised". However among political analysts there is overwhelming an opinion that the utmost attention of Ukrainian executive authorities to the development of intensive cooperation with NATO promotes creation of objective preconditions for acquisition of such membership in future. Among political parties of Ukraine, only the People's Rukh of Ukraine (loudly, persistently and immediately) and People's-Democratic Party (generally in a concealed form and leaving it for the future) speak for Ukraine's membership in NATO. The rest of public politicians (except the left-wing ones protesting against the exercises of NATO troops in the territory of Ukraine) prefer a more reserved standpoint in the issues of membership in NATO and expediency or non-expediency of preservation of the country's non-aligned orientation. Thus, the problem of westward integration generally concerns the prospects and trends of the state's development (and reflects the attitude to the problem of representatives of various political and social groups). In this regard, the prospect of Ukraine' membership to NATO has any and all features of "postponed demand", whereas the actual unreality of the state's accession to the North-Atlantic Alliance in close future is recognized even by those speaking for Ukraine's membership in the Organisation. At the same time, as one can see from paragraph 3 of the report, a conviction that development of cooperation with NATO is an unconditioned imperative for Ukraine has been growing.

As well as in 1997, in 1998 the expert positive estimations of Ukraine's foreign policy from the point of view of stability, deliberatedness and predictability sharply increased in summer compared to March and began to decrease again in September. Alongside with that, the estimations of stability of foreign policy significantly decreased by December, 1998 having reached the level of the beginning of the same year, while those of deliberatedness and predictability remained unchanged. As a whole, the estimation at the three indices ranged between "low" and "intermediate" marks. Alongside with that, the predictability of foreign policy joined by the stability in the second half of the year were lower than the foreign policy's deliberatedness.

The State of Ukraine's Bilateral Relations with Foreign States and Alignments

The four countries, development of relations with which is of primary importance for Ukraine today, still comprises the USA, Germany, Russia and Poland. Formerly, Russia occupied the first position among the priority countries, but due to an essential loss of significance of a country with which Ukraine should first of all develop relations occurred in September (after the crisis), it ceded to the USA and Germany. Poland, which, by the way, has the most successful relations with Ukraine, is, according to the priority, behind the mentioned three countries. Among other countries, with which it is necessary to develop relations, there were constantly mentioned: France, Turkey, Azerbaijan, China, Great Britain, Belarus; less often – the Republic of Korea and Georgia. In 1997, besides the mentioned ones there were Romania, Kazakstan, Canada and the Baltic states. These and other countries are periodically mentioned, but they are not attached a highest priority.

In experts' opinion, the development of Ukraine's relations with the priority countries has not always been most intensive and successful. According to summary results of the poll, Ukraine had the best relations with Poland and after that, at a significant distance, with the USA and Germany. Compared to 1997, the estimation of the state of Ukraine's relations with Germany improved. According to the 1998 data (intensity of development of bilateral relations with Ukraine), Germany is followed by the Republic of Korea, France, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and the Baltic states. Constantly there were mentioned, though to a less extent, Israel and Moldova, less often – Great Britain and Kazakstan. Other countries were also mentioned, though depending on situation and the latest course of events (high-level visits): in particular – Hungary (in December) and Argentina (in June). To this or that extent, all the indicated countries were mentioned in 1997 too. In 1998, the experts almost did not consider Canada among Ukraine's leading partners, though in 1997 it occupied significant positions (3-4th positions in the end of 1997) among countries, with which Ukraine had intensive relations during the year.

The highest estimations according to the successfulness of realization of Ukraine's national interests at the international arena were given to Ukrainian diplomacy as a general during the year at the directions of relations with Poland (3.66-4.05 points at a 5-point scale) and the UNO (3.58-3.92). A bit lower but comparatively high estimations were obtained by the diplomacy for relations with Germany (3.27-3.44 points, higher than in 1997), NATO (3.13-3.54), the USA (2.95-3.42 points, lower than in 1997 due to the worsening of relations in spring, 1998), Central-Eastern European countries as a general (3.08-3.26). The experts pointed out a certain decrease of the level of relations with the Baltic states in spring, 1998, which resulted in the ever lowest estimation of the efforts of diplomacy exerted on this direction. As a result, the total annual estimation of relations with the Baltic states decreased compared to 1997 (2.95-3.16 points). According to experts, the efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy in realization of Ukraine's national interests during the year were least successful at directions of relations with the Asian-Pacific region countries, the countries of Latin America, the Middle East and Persian Gulf, and in relations with Russia (2.29-2.72 points). As a general, in the beginning of 1998 the estimations of diplomacy at almost all directions essentially decreased. After that they increased in summer (as a result of shifts in the leadership and beginning of reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and decreased again by December.

The experts first of all pointed out Poland and the USA as Ukraine's allies. As mentioned, the relations with Germany essentially improved, and its rating as an ally also increased. The experts indicated Germany after Poland and the USA. In 1997, Germany occupied the 6th position following Poland, the USA, NATO, the Baltic states and Council of Europe. The same way, alongside with Poland and the USA, Germany was regarded as a country Ukraine could rely on in military reform cooperation. Germany was followed by such important allies as NATO, Council of Europe and the Baltic states. Compared to 1997, the OSCE has been acquiring significance from the beginning of 1998, the EU – from June, 1998. As before, Russia and the CIS were regarded as possible allies of Ukraine for the last place. The EAPC and WEU were not mentioned as allies at all.

As regards the CIS, the low rating of this structure can probably be explained by non-effectiveness and even the hopeless crisis of the Commonwealth. In particular, it was overtly stressed by presidents of Kazakstan and Ukraine at the Davos Economic Forum of 1999. The low rating of the EAPC is explained by the fact that this organization does not have an independent sphere of activities and acts as a NATO-managed formal structure uniting the countries, which are not members to NATO and have joined "Partnership for Peace" program. The allusions to WEU in the list of Ukraine's allies would also look inappropriate whereas despite the desperate efforts of Ukrainian executive authorities the country failed to acquire the status of an associate member thereof. Besides, the reserved character of WEU's powers makes intensification of its activities possible only under an appropriate political will of the EU.

The estimations of the effectiveness of activities of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine in the issues of defense, national security and foreign policy kept on decreasing little-by-little from June, while during 1997 and in the beginning of 1998 they had been constantly growing. As a whole, the effectiveness of the Supreme Rada's work is estimated as "low" or close thereto. Probably, such a conclusion was related to the alteration of deputies' corps as a result of the 1998 elections and to the transition of both related committees of the parliament – the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS and the Committee for Defense and National Security – under the control of Communists.

Parameters and Desirable Trends of Ukraine's Cooperation with NATO

As mentioned, during 1998 there had been strengthening the pro-NATO orientation, which was supported by about one half of the experts. In the end of the year, the variant of "accession to NATO" as the one most corresponding to Ukraine's national interests gained the overwhelming majority of responds (68.6%). If we add here the least probable possibility of "accession to NATO together with the CIS countries", the orientation at accession to NATO shall be regarded as dominating among the experts' preferences for a long period of time.

The process of Ukraine's westward integration – with NATO and the EU – got essentially slower compared to 1997. Without essential changes, it was rather "slow". NATO kept on being regarded as one of the main allies of Ukraine, though to a less extent than in 1997, after Poland (which is joining NATO) and the USA and Germany (NATO members). A bit lower estimation compared to 1997 was obtained by Ukrainian diplomacy for realization of Ukraine's national interests in relations with NATO – during the year, at an average – 3.31 points (in 1997 – 3.43) at a 5-point scale. On the other hand, this is one of the highest estimations of Ukrainian diplomacy's efforts compared to other trends of relations. Higher estimations were obtained only for development of relations with Poland (3.89), the UNO (3.70) and Germany (3.35).

The approving of the State Program of Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO to 2001 under the Presidential Decree of 4 November 1998 is estimated by the experts as one of the most significant events having a positive effect on Ukraine's international situation and state of security.

From June, 1998, none of the experts deemed Ukraine's cooperation with NATO unnecessary. As before, (in the general variant) the experts regarded as the priority of Ukraine's cooperation with NATO such trends as "creation of preconditions for Ukraine's accession to NATO in future" (1st position according to significance) and "providing additional security guarantees to Ukraine" (2nd position). The latter trend lost to some extent its significance in June and October and therefore ceded to the former one (in 1997 it was at the 1st position). The trend of "direct assistance in the carrying out of military reform" occupied the third position.

These three trends of cooperation with NATO constantly remained the most important ones. They were followed, at a certain distance, by the necessity of "coordination of policies in connection with NATO's eastward enlargement" (4th position), which was a bit less often mentioned in the end of the year. From the second half of 1997, there occurred an increase of significance of cooperation in "trade with arms, special technics and services of military-technical purpose" (5th position according to significance). That lasted up to the end of 1998 when it ceded its significance. 6-7th positions were shared by "joint development of conceptual grounds of military policy" and "coordination of military-technical policies, MIC maintenance". Close to them – at the 8th position – is "staff training". As for the significance thereof, no essential changes took place, despite certain fluctuations in the course of the year. However the direction of "participation in peace-making operations" (9th position) whose importance increased from September, 1997 and was firm, began to lose it since June, 1998 and occupied the last position among priority trends in the end of the year. The trend of "joint exercises" (10th) never enjoyed high significance, but this does not exclude its importance. Other directions are not commonly mentioned by the experts among the priority ones.

If we employ an observer's approach to the interpretation of tasks of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, we shall see that the task of creation of preconditions for Ukraine's accession to NATO in the prospect looks as a priority one indeed. At the same time, the idea of granting Ukraine additional security guarantees may be deemed another illusion dating from L.Kravchuk's presidency and reflecting inadequacy of both the understanding of the Washington Treaty of 1949 (which does not provide for an interim, associated membership to the Alliance) and the logic of NATO's functioning as a defensive alliance. One should agree with importance of direct assistance in military reform for Ukraine, but actually such assistance is going to face opposition of executive structures of Ukraine, which are still unable to launch the processes of submission of the Armed Forces and other force structures to civil control.

We should emphasize the evident underestimation by the experts of the task of coordination of policies (of NATO and Ukraine) in relation to NATO's eastward enlargement, because even if one could speak of some preventive measures for the period between the beginning of NATO's enlargement and the desirable Ukraine's accession thereto, such measures would consist in political coordination at a permanent basis with an aim of taking into account the partner's interests.

Such tasks as cooperation in trade of arms, special technics and services of military-technical purpose; coordination of military-technical policies, MIC maintenance; and joint development of conceptual grounds of military policy constitute complementary directions of interaction. However Ukraine could actually calculate on them either in case of becoming an equal member of NATO or in case of conclusion of allied agreements with several leading states-members to NATO.

It is significant that such aspects of relations as "participation in peace-making operations" and "joint exercises" were estimated by overwhelming majority of experts as minor ones. This was explained by the fact that NATO would probably derive greater profit from them than Ukraine. At the same time, any participation in joint operations and exercises will not compensate the feeling of inferiority and loss of potential profit in case Ukrainian MIC fails to be recognized by NATO bodies as at least junior partner. Without development of a more or less equal interaction in this direction, the left-wing political parties will conduct a successful anti-NATO agitation blaming NATO countries at least for unfair and expansionist intentions.

Internal Determinants of Security Policy

As a general, the indices reflecting the elite leaders' level of influence on and confidence in officials in charge of Ukraine's foreign policy are higher than influence on officials in charge of Ukraine's defense policy. Alongside with this, the estimations of confidence are lower than those of influence. All of them range between "middle" and "low" marks (crisis of confidence?). As in 1997, the indices of influence decreased in the beginning of the year and then began to grow. Having reaches a maximum level in September, they remained at this level by the end of the year, that is more close to "intermediate" and to some extent lower than in 1997. The indices of confidence decreased in the beginning of 1998 and then began to increase up to September, and after that sharply declined in December. The level of confidence is, in general, more close to "low" than to "middle", as well as in 1997.

As regards the divergence between regions in the attitude to the state's foreign policy, the experts did not have an unanimous idea during the year. As a general, the main share of experts is thinking that regional differences remain unchanged. Uncertainty arises in the beginning and in the end of the year. In March, against the background of the unchanged character of the situation, the experts were more inclined to think that differences between regions were "deepening", while in December most experts thought that they were "leveling". A similar situation was registered in 1997.

The approaching of presidential elections, which, according to the Constitution, are to take place on 31 October 1999, stimulated the authors' attention to determination of experts' expectations regarding foreign-policy sympathies and antipathies and other features of a "model" of the future president of Ukraine.

According to the poll at particular questions, which was carried out during 1998, we should point out an increase of potential adherence to a candidate to the presidential position at the 1999 elections, which would support Ukraine's comprehensive economic integration with the West, and vice versa – a decrease of potential support of a candidate, which would speak for a balanced development of Ukraine's relations with both the West and Russia.

A particular direction of the research consisted in the studying of perception by the experts of the main goals of Ukraine's foreign policy.

The main goals of Ukraine's foreign policy can be distributed into the following three groups (grouped according to a general average estimation):

1. The experts think that the most important goal consists in "creation of conditions where Ukraine would not worry about the condition of its security and would be able to focus at resolution of its domestic problems". (This goal can be regarded as an ideal task of foreign policy of every state, which however can be provided either by a status of a superpower or by an internationally recognized and warranted permanent Switzerland-type neutrality).

The experts deemed important, though to a less extent, the following goals:

2. the set-up and development of partnership relations with Russia;
3. the functioning of the East-West, North-South transport corridor;
4. creation of a general security system, which would exclude the war as a means of resolution of international conflicts;
5. deepening of partnership relations with the Central-Eastern European and Baltic states;
6. obtaining of a large-scale aid and investments from the Western states;
7. deepening of partnership relations with the CIS;
8. creation of preconditions for Ukraine's future accession to NATO;
9. initiating of further disarmament, complete and ultimate banning of nuclear tests".

In this context, we can point out a certain contradiction of the experts' preferences, whereas alongside with the pro-NATO orientation at accession to this defense alliance (the strength and influence whereof are based on the modern types of arms) there is also mentioned the initiative of further disarmament. We rather deal with two orientations of different character (more pragmatic, pro-Western and more idealistic, pacifist ones), which reflected in the results of the poll. Otherwise, there is working an inertia of Ukraine's unilateral nuclear disarmament, which is going to cause a subconscious inclination to such ideas as universal nuclear disarmament, creation of a general security system, which would exclude the war as a means of international conflicts resolution and etc., for a long time. It is time to wonder, wasn't it the reason for the hardly foreseeable success of the Green Party at the parliamentary elections in Ukraine in spring, 1998. If so, this means that besides a successful exploitation of political advertising they managed to base themselves on the actual determinants of social consciousness of the population of Ukraine.

The rest of the goals do not have contradictory character, because they mainly envisage a set-up of friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the neighboring states.

Most experts regarded the following goals as secondary:

10. achievement of recognition and strengthening of Ukraine as a regional leader of Central-Eastern European countries (under current circumstances, this goal can be unreservedly rendered unreal and utopian, reflecting either the remnant superpower consciousness or nostalgia for economic and political stability);
11. strengthening of the missile technologies non-proliferation regime;
12. UNO reformation;
13. development of cooperation with the "new nuclear states", such as India and Pakistan.

In this list, noteworthy is the insignificant support of the thesis of strengthening of missile technologies non-proliferation regime, though such regime is an evident priority for Ukraine's Western allies and a precondition of development of scientific and technical cooperation between Ukraine and NATO members.

As a general, the results obtained in the course of the research testify to a contradictory character of attitudes of the politically active strata of the society, which have a relation to the formation of foreign policy and the foreign-policy process. These attitudes are sometimes able to unite such contradictory themes as anti-Russian feelings and striving for establishment of partnership relations with Russia, a desire to strengthen the state's security through obtaining of external security guarantees, striving for the West's financial and economic aid and, at the same time, wanting the country to be a regional leader in Central-Eastern Europe.

It is significant that in December, 1998 32.4% of the respondents stated that in their opinion the crisis in Russia had a positive effect on Ukraine's international situation, because there emerged objective preconditions for "withdrawal from Russia's shadow". However, the overwhelming majority of respondents provided a more adequate response. 43.2% stated that the effect of the Russian crisis in Ukraine was negative, 16.2% having said that the effect of the crisis had both positive and negative aspects.

As regards the effect of own economic crisis of autumn, 1998 – winter, 1999 on foreign policy and international position of Ukraine, the response of experts has not become clearly expressed yet. Probably, the fact that executive structures of Ukraine managed to avert the collapse of the national financial system and avoid repeating of the Russian decline to some extent postponed Ukraine's actual difficulties at the international arena. Unavoidable is the growth of the state's financial dependence on the leading powers of the world, that may become one of the most important aspects of Ukraine's foreign-policy situation in close future, in particular, in 1999.

The 1998 crisis evidently resulted in increase of Ukraine's foreign-policy vulnerability, unlike the former state of relative equal distance and freedom of maneuver achieved as a result of the 1997 foreign-policy successes.

¹The estimations of the extent of Ukraine's integration in Western direction have to some extent conditional, "summary" character whereas they include the estimation of the level of ties with NATO and participation in measures and programs of NATO/EAPC/PFP, and an appropriate sum of estimations of ties with EU. Whereas there are reasonable grounds to regard the processes of enlargement of NATO and EU/WEU as separate and to some extent different forms of integration, it looks expedient to differ in future between these processes in the course of sociological polls. Moreover, the current condition, effectiveness and trends of Ukraine's relations with NATO and EU are very different. For instance, objectively the rates of development of relations and cooperation between Ukraine and NATO can be characterized as mean-intensive. Vice versa, the relations with EU, which in the first half of 1998 were stagnant, acquired features of negative dynamics in the second half of 1998 as a result of the crisis in Ukraine and Russia.

²In 1997-1999, in political circles and mass media, there became widely spread ideas of a deep crisis of the CIS. Taking this into account, the CIS became further more interpreted by political community not as an international organization or integration alignment, but as a further less effective institutionalized structure for interaction of political leadership of the post-Soviet countries. In practice, within the post-Soviet space there were seen several interstate mechanisms and projects, which could acquire the character of long-lasting interaction structures or even integration communities in the future (under certain circumstances). These include the Russian-Belorussian alliance, the quadruple customs union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and the relatively new alignment GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). Thus, the problem of Ukraine's integration ties with post-Soviet republics also requires clarification, because within the limits of CIS simultaneous action of several trends is observed. These include:

• comparatively stable relations of Ukraine with Belarus and Turkmenistan;
• an evident disintegration in Ukraine's relations with Russia and some other post-Soviet republics (Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan);
• development of the project for exploitation of the transport corridor the Caspian region–West Europe involving Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Poland, which creates rather reliable prospects for a long-lasting cooperation within the framework of GUAM.

Such circumstances require clarification of the issues regarding CIS in the questionnaire of the expert poll under the "Monitoring" program. More concrete and differentiated questions will be considered.