In December, 1998, the Center for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine (previously – the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies) carried out the fourth in 1998 (generally – the eighth) expert estimation of the condition and main trends of Ukraine's foreign policy. This poll continued the program of Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy Monitoring, which has been conducted during 1997-1998.

During all the polls, analogous instruments were used, with certain addenda depending on the course of events.

In December, 1998 40 experts were involved, comprising representatives of four groups:

1. Officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and employees of research structures rendering advice to state authorities (the National Institute of Strategic Studies, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the NAS of Ukraine, etc.) – 12 experts.
2. People's deputies of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine, first of all – members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Ties with the CIS and the Committee for Defense and National Security, representing the political spectrum: left wing–center–right wing – 6 experts.
3. Servicemen with the Armed Forces of Ukraine having the rank not less than lieutenant-colonel, including officials from the Ministry of Defense, professors and specialists of military higher educational institutions and research centers, most of them having a scientific degree (military professional intellectual elite) – 11 experts.
4. Leading journalists specializing in international subjects and representing the most influential mass media. There are grounds to think that they have an influence on not only the public consciousness in the matter of the research, but also on the standpoint of political elite (establishment) – 11 experts.

General Features of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

The "pro-NATO" orientation dominated among the foreign-policy ones in December, 1998. It comprised the adherents of "Ukraine's accession to NATO independently from other countries" – 68.6% and "together with CIS countries" – 5.7% (as a whole – 74.3%). In September, 1998 this orientation also enjoyed an overwhelming majority of experts' votes – 61.6% (35.9%+15.4%). In December, the way of Ukraine's accession to NATO independently from other countries was actually alternativeless, the only one most corresponding to the national interest of Ukraine. Another essential variant of geopolitical orientation – "non-aligned and/or neutral status of Ukraine" gradually lost its weight having in December the correlation of 25.7% vs 74.3% (accession to NATO), while in September this correlation was 35.9% vs 61.6%. Such variants as "Ukraine's accession to a military alliance of the CIS countries" or any other ones are generally regarded as least actual.

The probability of threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity generally decreased a little in December, the expectation of danger having to some extent become remote in temporal dimension. The number of experts considering that "there is no threat, but it should be expected in 3-5 years" became three times as great (21.6%) as in September (7.5%). Only 10.8% of experts pointed out a direct presence of threat (in September – 17.5%). The absence of a threat but possibility of emergence thereof at any moment was also notified by fewer experts than before – 32.4% (in September – 40%). Other estimations also altered: "there is no threat and there are all preconditions for preventing it" think 24.3% (in September – 22.5%) of experts; "the threat should emerge in 1-2 years" – 10.8% (in September – 12.5%) of experts.

The condition of international security in Ukraine, as well as in Europe as a whole is still estimated by major experts as "unchanged" – 62.2% and 64.9% of experts accordingly (in September – 50% and 65.8% of experts). Against this background, the fewer experts point out the aggravation of international security – 16.2% (in September – 23.7%) in Europe and 21.6% (36.8%) – regarding Ukraine. Instead of this, they more often spoke of improvement thereof both regarding Ukraine (16.2%, in September – 5.3%) and Europe as a whole (16.2%, in September – 7.9%).

Accordingly, the level of international guarantees of Ukraine's security provided thereto by other countries is currently increasing little-by-little, making greater the distance to low estimations and getting close to "intermediate" ones. The main role in the provision of Ukraine's international security is certainly played by economic determinants, as think 73% of experts, which are followed by political ones, according to 29.7% of experts. Alongside therewith, almost insignificant is the influence of social-cultural (8.1%), ecological (5.4%) and military (2.7%) factors. In September, vice versa, the leading determinants provisionally were of political character – 52.5%, followed by economic (45%) and social-cultural (5%) determinants.

In turn, the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not play a very important role in the provision of national security of the country. The extent to which Ukraine has to rely on them is being constantly estimated by the experts as ranging between "low" and "intermediate". Besides, their readiness is constantly getting worse, according to 70.3% of experts (in September – 67.5%) or remains unchanged (21.6%, in September – 22.5%). In the provision of defensive capacity of Ukraine, the most important role is played by economic factors (73%, in September – 66.7%), the rest (political – 16.2%, social-cultural – 8.1%, military – 5.4%; in September – not more than 20%) being comparatively insignificant.

As well as in September, the indices of stability, deliberatedness and predictability of Ukraine's foreign policy ranged in December between "intermediate" and "low" estimations. At the expense of a certain decrease of stability of the policy, the expert estimations thereof according to this criterion, as well as according to that of predictability were to some extent lower than those of its deliberatedness.

The expert estimations testify to the slowering of integration processes in any directions compared to September. The only exception is the process of Ukraine's integration to the Central-Eastern European region (the Vysegrad countries), the condition of which remained at the same level and is estimated by most experts as "slow". The estimations of the process of Ukraine's integration in the Western direction – with NATO, EU and etc., and into the Black Sea region (BSEF), which were a bit higher before, also got close to the same level ("slow"). Ukraine's integration in the Eastern direction (Russia, CIS) also became less intensive, getting very close to the "nought" estimation compared to "slow" one in September. As a result, the intensity of integration process in this direction is being estimated essentially lower than in the other ones.

The experts pointed out the four main groups most concerned about integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state; in September these were five, but in December the group of "regional leaders of the East and the South" was not any more essential among the adherents of integration with Russia – 18.9% (in September – 42.5%). The leading groups concerned still are "politicians of pro-Russian orientation' – 78.4% (in September – 77.5%) and "the left-wing deputies at the Supreme Rada" – 78.4% (in September – 70%). Besides, among the adherents of integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state the experts mentioned "socially deprived strata of population" – 40.5% (in September – 37.5%) and "industrialists from Ukrainian-Russian groups" – 37.8% (in September – 45%) of experts. According to the experts, less concerned groups are "leaders of MIC enterprises oriented at cooperation with Russia" – 24.3% (in September – 15%) and, as mentioned, "regional leaders of the East and the South". The group of "officers at the Armed Forces" and any other groups are almost not mentioned among the main adherents of integration in this direction – 2.7% (in September – 2.5-5%) per each group.

It is interesting to note that the group of "officers at the Armed Forces" was not mentioned by the experts either among the adherents of integration with the West, up to accession to NATO, as well as the "heads of military educational institutions" (in September each of the two was mentioned by 2.6% of experts). It evidently testifies to political apathy of servicemen, or in the best case – to their political impartiality.

Among those most concerned about integration with the West, the experts constantly pointed out, with certain insignificant alterations of order, the following five groups:

• the right-wing deputies at the Supreme Rada – 89.2% (in September – 84.2%);
• the centrists at the SR – 45.9% (in September – 34.2%);
• intermediate businessmen – 37.8% (in September – 23.7%);
• leaders of finance and banking business – 35.1% (in September – 36.8%);
• leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the generals – 24.3% (in September – 23.7%).

In September the experts also mentioned in relation to the above such a group as "producers of arms and special technics", but in December this group was mentioned as insignificant – 8.1% (in September – 21.1%), following the "leaders of MIC enterprises" – 10.8% (in September – 7.9%). Other categories do not manifest a significant concern about integration in the indicated direction (as a whole – 5.4%, in September absent at all).

State of Relations with Foreign States and Alignments

Among the countries the development of relations wherewith is the priority one for Ukraine, Russia is at the first position again (87%). In September it essentially lost its weight to the 4th position (49%). Russia is followed by the same three priority countries ranking in the same order as in September: the USA (82%), Germany (76%), Poland (54%). From September, among the countries, which are priority but less important, the experts began to point out France (22%) and continued to mention Turkey (11%). Relations with other countries are deemed comparatively less significant.

Despite the fact that the development of relations with Russia is deemed the priority one, this country is sharing only the 7th position with Turkey (11%) among the countries, the development of relations wherewith could be called successful and intensive. The same situation was registered in September. Ukraine enjoys the most intensive and successful development of relations with Poland (77%), than, at a significant distance, the USA (49%) and Germany (29%). After that, the experts mentioned Hungary (20%), Georgia (14%), the Baltic states (14%), Turkey (11%) and Russia (11%). In September, besides the USA (51%) and Germany (27%), the experts mentioned Republic of Korea (30%), France and Azerbaijan (27% per each) and at last – Russia (19%).

Thus, the relations with Russia are far from being at the best level. According to estimation of bilateral relations, it is at the 33rd place among 36 countries (in September – 34th). As an ally, it is still keeping the next to last position among other mentioned countries (11.4%, in September – 15%). As a military-political ally, it is at the last position – 19.4%, in September – 12.5%). Accordingly, the successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with Russia is estimated in almost the worst mode (2.32 points). In turn, most experts (82.9%) think that the ratification in December, 1998 of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 31 May 1997 by the State Duma of Russia was among the events, which had the most positive effect on Ukraine's international situation and security last year. As regards the effect of the current crisis in Russia, the opinions of experts split: 32.4% of them think that the crisis had a positive effect on international situation of Ukraine, because there emerged objective preconditions for withdrawal "from Russia's shadow" and acquisition of more features of a subject of international policy, while 43.2% deem this effect negative, because the crisis in Russia will lead to aggravation of economic, social and political problems in Ukraine and we are going to repeat Russia's way. 8.1% think that this effect was positive and negative in different spheres, therefore the summary positive and negative effects of the crisis on Ukraine neutralize each other. 16.2% think that there was no effect at all. In September most experts regarded the effect of the Russian crisis as negative (67.6%).

In spite of a certain decrease of the absolute index, Ukraine still has the best relations with Poland. The experts pointed it out as the first country most successfully and intensively developing relations with Ukraine and included it into the first permanent "four" priority countries (the 4th position), with which Ukraine should first of all develop relations. As well as in September, Poland occupied the first position according to estimation of bilateral relations – 4.11 points (5-point scale), despite a certain decrease of expert estimations (at an average for all countries). As an ally, Poland is keeping the first position alongside with the USA – 62.9% (in September – the 2nd – 57.5%). Only as a country on which Ukraine can rely in the reformation of its Armed Forces, it cedes to the USA (55.6%, in September – 57.5%) and remains at the second position – 44.4% (in September – 37.5%). In the direction of bilateral relations with Poland, Ukrainian diplomacy is most successfully realizing Ukraine's national interest, according to expert estimation, which has to some extent decreased from September (3.86 points, in September – 4.05 points).

After Poland, the experts gave high estimations to the condition of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Georgia (3.86 points) and the USA (3.73 points). These countries remained among the first five countries having the best condition of bilateral relations with Ukraine, as well as in the beginning of autumn. The estimations of Ukraine's bilateral relations with Azerbaijan and the Republic of Korea, which belonged to the "five" in September, decreased to some extent. In December they occupied accordingly the 9th and 17th positions. Instead of this, the 4th position was occupied by Germany (3.72 points), which was the 6th one in September (3.67 points), while the 5th position – by Canada (3.65 points), which was the 7th (3.65 points).

Ukraine's relations with the Baltic states became a bit better – from 14th (3.42 points) to 8th position (3.51 points). This correlates with estimation thereof as allies of Ukraine: they occupied 4-5th positions (28.6%) together with NATO – after the USA, Poland and Germany, while in September they were next to last (15%), together with Russia and EU.

The rank of estimation of bilateral relations is continued by four countries, which do not lag much from the leaders, namely Hungary, Israel, the Baltic states and Azerbaijan (3.56-3.50 points). In September this list comprised Germany, Canada, Israel, Moldova and France (3.67-3.60 points).

The last group of outsiders comprises the countries of Latin America, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, Russia, the countries of Asian-Pacific region, Belarus, Iran (2.75-2.38 points). In September these were Belarus, the countries of Latin America, Japan, the countries of Asian-Pacific region, Romania, Russia, Norway, Iran (2.90-2.77 points).

The estimations of successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy at international arena regarding the realization of Ukraine's national interest have been decreasing or remaining the same since September. The only exclusions in September were such directions as relations with CIS and international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD), where the estimations increased. In December such exclusions were the directions of relations with NATO, UN, the Baltic states and the countries of Central-Eastern Europe as a whole.

The Ukrainian diplomacy received comparatively high estimations for development of relations with Poland (3.86 points), UN (3.61), the USA 3.38), NATO (3.32), the countries of Central-Eastern Europe as a whole (3.31). The above countries and those of Western Europe were the only ones where Ukrainian diplomacy was estimated over "3" points. There occurred an essential decrease of absolute estimations of Ukrainian diplomats' efforts in relations with international financial institutions compared to September (from 3.61 to 2.73 points). As well as in September, the lowest estimations were given to relations with the countries of the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Latin America, Russia and the Asian-Pacific region (2.29-2.56 points; in September – 2.47-2.55).

Poland (62.9%; in September – 57.5%) and the USA (60%; in September – 67.5%) are still the main allies of Ukraine. Besides, with a certain lag, the experts pointed out Germany (31.4%, in September – 22.5%), NATO (28.6%, in September – 27.5%) and the Baltic states (28.8%, in September – 15%). Among important allies the expert mentioned the Council of Europe (20%, in September 27.5%) and EU (20%, in September 15%). Less important in this regard are OSCE (14.3%, in September 22.5%), Russia (11.4%, in September 15%) and CIS (8.6%, in September 7.5%). The NACC and WEU were not mentioned as allies at all. As well as before, the experts think that in the military reforming Ukraine can rely on cooperation with the USA (55.6%, in September 57.5%), Poland (44.4%, in September 37.5%) and Germany (36.1%, in September 30%). As in September, comparatively high is the percentage of experts thinking that there are no countries, on which Ukraine could rely in this regard (22.2%, in September 25%).

The Ukraine's having to follow the lead of other countries or alignments, being subordinate to orders or expectations thereof, even when this is in conflict with the national interest, decreased in December, getting closer to the "intermediate" level. (Wasn't it the result of further weakening of the "elder brother" – Russia?). At the same time, the extent to which Ukraine has to rely on its allies in the realization of its foreign-policy goals decreased, getting closer to the "low" level.

The estimations of effectiveness of the Supreme Rada's work regarding the issues of defense, security and foreign policy continue to decrease, ranging between "nought" and "low", while in September they were equal to "low".

Parameters and Desirable Trends of Cooperation with NATO

The orientation at Ukraine's accession to NATO independently from other countries is dominating over the alternative of Ukraine's independent, non-aligned status. In December this was even more evident than in September. 68.6% (in September 46.2%) of experts deem the former variant more suitable to Ukraine's national interest than the latter one – 25.7% (in September 35.9%). Besides, extra 5.7% (in September 15.4%) of experts regard a variant of "accession to NATO", but together with CIS countries. Thus, as a general, the pro-NATO orientation is the basic one for foreign-policy preferences of experts.

Though the process of Ukraine's integration with NATO and EU is developing rather slowly, as well as in September, NATO is still among the main allies of Ukraine – 28.6% (in September – 27.5%), after Poland (62.9%), the USA (60%) and Germany (31.4%). The successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy in the realization of Ukraine's national interests in relations with NATO received a relatively high estimation (3.32 points at a 5-point scale), a bit higher than in September (3.25), after the directions of relations with Poland (3.86) and UN (3.61).

As well as in September, nobody of the experts deemed Ukraine's cooperation with NATO unnecessary. The trend of "providing additional security guarantees to Ukraine", which occupied the 3rd position in September (40%), regained the first position (62.2%). At the 2nd place the experts put "creation of preconditions for Ukraine's prospective accession to NATO" – that was mentioned by 59.5% of experts (in September – 50%, 1st position). The trend of "direct assistance in the realization of military reform" 51.4% (in September – 42.5%, 2nd position) occupied the 3rd position. These three trends of cooperation with NATO are the permanent priorities. Further, the experts pointed out the trend of "staff training" (24.3%), the importance whereof has essentially grown (previously it occupied the last positions – 9th and 10th in September – 7.5%). The 5th and 6th positions (18.9%) are shared by the necessity of "coordination of policies in relation to NATO's eastward enlargement" (in September – 27.5%, 4-5th places) and "joint development of concept of military policy" (in September 12.5%, 8th position). The 7th position is occupied by "coordination of military-technical policy, maintenance of Ukraine's MIC" – 16.2%. The importance of this trend decreased a little from October, when it occupied the 4-5th positions (27.5%). The same way, the trend of "trade of arms, special technics and services of military-technical purpose" lost its significance, occupying the 8th position (13.5%), while in September it was the 6th (25%). The 9th position (10.8%), as well as in September (7.5%, 9-10th) is occupied by "joint exercises". The significance of "participation in peace-making operations" decreased from the 7th position (15%) in September to 10th (8.1%) in December. Other trends were not mentioned by the experts among the priority ones.

Internal Determinants of Security Policy

The indices of the level of influence of elite leaders on the officials in charge of foreign policy are higher than those of influence on officials in charge of defense policy of Ukraine. The estimations grew in September and remained at the same level in December, ranging between "intermediate" and "low", closer to intermediate. The estimations of the level of influence are generally higher than those of the level of confidence, which ranges between "intermediate" and "low", closer to "low". The estimations of confidence the elite leaders have in state officials in charge of defense policy of Ukraine grew in September and decreased again in December. As well as the estimations of influence, they are lower than the level of confidence in officials in charge of Ukraine's foreign policy – the latter has not changed since September.

As regards divergences between regions, the experts' opinions split. 35.1% consider that they are leveling (in September – 27.7%), while 40.5% think that they "remain unchanged' (in September – 57.5%). Only 13.5% think that they are deepening (in September – 10%). 10.8% of experts do not have a clear standpoint.

The basic objectives of Ukraine's foreign policy could be conditionally divided into three groups (arranged according to average estimation):

In December, 1998 the experts pointed out the following most important objectives:

1. creation of conditions whereunder Ukraine would not have to worry about the condition of its security and be able to focus at its domestic problems (71.4% of experts);
2. creation of a general security system, which would exclude war as a means of resolution of international conflicts (57.6%). In September this objective lost its significance, ranging, according to expert estimations, between important and very important (5th position);
3. the functioning of transport corridor North-South, East-West (50% of experts, in September – the 2nd position).

Important, though to a smaller extent:

4. establishment and development of partnership relations with Russia (in September – the 3rd position, between important and very important);
5. deepening of partnership with the Baltic and Central-Eastern European states ( 4th position in September);
6. obtaining of wide-scale aid and investments from the Western countries ( 6th position in September);
7. creation of preconditions for future Ukraine's accession to NATO – the do not suggest an unanimous estimation – between "very important", "important" and "insignificant" (in September – 8th position). Here a certain correction of the pro-NATO orientation should be pointed out: it is desirable for Ukraine but does not resolve its urgent problems in international sphere;
8. deepening of partnership with CIS countries ( in September – 7th position);

The expert did not have an unanimous opinion ("important" or "insignificant") regarding such objectives as:

9. initiative of further disarmament, complete and final banning of nuclear tests (9th position in September);
10. achievement and recognition and strengthening of Ukraine as a regional leader of Central-Eastern European countries (11th position in September);

Most experts deem insignificant such objectives as:

11. strengthening of regime of non-proliferation of missile technologies (10th position in September);
12. reformation of the UNO (12 the position in September);
13. development of cooperation with the "new nuclear powers" – India, Pakistan (13th position in September).

The events of 1998, which had the most positive effect on Ukraine's international situation and security are as follows:

1) the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between EU and Ukraine of 1994, which came into effect in 1998 (91.9%);
2) approval under Presidential Decree of 4 November 1998 of the State program of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO till 2001 (89.2%);
3) ratification by the Russian State Duma of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation dated 31 May 1997 (82.9%);
4) Ukraine's participation in the "Partnership for Peace" program (78.4%);
5) settlement without use of force of the crisis in Cosovo according to Ukraine's standpoint (62.2%);
6) appointment of B.Tarasyuk to the post of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine (59.5%);
7-9) results of work of the Ukraine-EU commission created in 1998 (56.8%);
7-9) the Program of economic cooperation of the RF and Ukraine for 1998-2007 signed by the presidents of the two states in February, 1998 (48.6%);
7-9) results of work of the Ukrainian-American interstate commission L.Kuchma-A.Gore (48.6%).