General Characteristics of Ukraine's Foreign Policy
According to the expert estimation, the current situation of Ukraine's international security could be deemed comparatively safe (at least, compared with other periods of the research conducted this year). In the end of 1997 the least concern of the experts about the presence of an external threat to Ukraine during the whole year was registered, while the greatest threat was marked in March and September, a little less in June. In December only 19.5% of the experts stressed the presence of the threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (it is 1.5 times less than in March and September, in June 22.5%), the possibility of emergence of the threat at any moment was emphasized by 31.7% of the experts (50% in March, 42.5% in June, 43.9% in September). In turn, the absence of such a threat and the existence of all the preconditions for preventing its emergence was stressed by 34.1% of the experts (it was two times as large as in March 14.3%, and three times as large as in September 9.8%; in June 27.5%). The assumption that the emergence of the threat should be expected in 1-2 years or in 3-5 years was shared by an insignificant group of the experts from 2.4% in March to 7.3% in September.

These evaluations coincide with the results of the poll testifying to the realization by the foreign-policy environment of Ukraine of positive changes regarding the state of international security in Europe as a whole compared with the beginning of the year, though the positive character of the expert evaluations suffered a certain decline in September. According to their estimations, since March the state of international security in Europe has not got worse, but remained unchanged and to a certain extent got better. As for the determination of the state of international security in Europe during the year, according to most Ukrainian foreign-policy experts, it is little lower than in Europe as a whole. Since June, when in experts' opinion the situation grew better compared with March, no essential changes in this respect have taken place. Though at the same time the level of international guaranties to Ukraine from other countries had been gradually increasing during the year. In December the experts estimated it as close to the "middle" level, while in March they consciously estimated it as "low". Besides, since June, when a certain worsening of estimations of this index was registered, among the foreign-policy environment one could observe the growth of the importance and role of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in providing national security the extent to which Ukraine should rely on its own Armed Forces in providing national security. However, according to expert estimations, readiness of the Armed Forces is constantly worsening. The poll testifies that, in providing national security of Ukraine, during the year the role of economic determinants (this group was stressed by 63-73% of experts) and political determinants (24-46% of experts) had been growing.

These factors are connected with the forthcoming parliamentary elections scheduled for March 1998 and realization of the weakness of Ukrainian democratic institutions by Ukraine's partners.

The estimation of the extent to which Ukraine has to follow orders and expectations of other states and alignments, even contradicting its national interest, was rather ambiguous. According to expert estimation, in June and September such "extent" was growing, ranging between "high" and "middle" (more close to "middle"), but lessened in December, ranging between "middle" and "low" (more close to "middle"). It is evident that the final estimations by the foreign-policy circles of the lessening of the extent of Ukraine's dependence on the standpoint of other states and alignments were caused by certain objective circumstances connected with signing bilateral political treaties with Russia and Romania, the Charter on Distinctive Partnership with NATO, important documents with the states of Central Europe. From the formal, objectivist point of view, in the second half of 1997 Ukraine's foreign policy acquired the extent of self-sufficiency (in respect of independence on external determinants) it never had had since proclaiming independence in 1991. This self-sufficiency was caused by almost simultaneous settling the most acute and contradictive matters in relations with Russia and Romania (that instantly led to minimization of actual or evident determinants of external threat) on one hand and by the establishment of a certain level of institutional linkages with NATO as the most important defensive and military-political organization of the advanced industrial democracies, on the other hand.

Taking into account the stable Ukrainian tradition of foreign-policy balance at the international arena, one could forecast strengthening of the elements of demonstrative "equal distance" alongside with ever great regionalization of practical interest and tasks of the diplomacy. This balance is going to acquire features of a certain functional distribution of interests and spheres of cooperation, the economic aspects dominating in relations with Russia and other post-Soviet countries and military-political plots in relations with the western states.

However there is a number of objective determinants which could cause an essential strengthening of Ukraine's external dependence on foreign partners. There belong first of all economic and financial circumstances and certain subjective determinants. In relations with Russia this dependence may result in "conversion" of debts in the form of transfer of shares of some economically attractive enterprises. In relations with the West (the USA and EU countries), the deficiency of budget and non-stability of Ukrainian financial system will cause aggravation of dependence on external loans and investments. This process is multi-fold. The unwillingness of Western investors to invest into Ukrainian economy can result in gradual lowering of prices for Ukrainian investment entities. Speaking conditionally, the lowering of prices to a certain level, alongside with the growth of the government's financial dependence on international financial institutions can reach the point where the profitability of investment conditions will exceed the influence of economic risk factors.

At the same time, in December the expert estimation of the extent to which Ukraine should rely on its allies in realization of its foreign-policy tasks increased a little. By the end of the year this estimation which did not alter earlier became more close to "middle" one.

In respect of integration processes, certain correlated changes, especially in the Eastern and the Western directions, took place during the year. As the process of integration with Russia and CIS became more and more intensive, the rates of integration with NATO, EU, etc. decreased. According to expert estimation, in December the situation essentially changed the process of eastward integration essentially lost its rates, while the westward integration became more intensive, the intensity being more close to the initial level (in March), this level being now close to "middle". As a whole, the process of integration with NATO, EU, etc. is much more intensive than the process of integration with Russia and the CIS, the status of the latter being close to "slow" one.

Besides, expert estimations testify to the fact that since March a certain intensification of Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region and into the Central and Eastern Europe had been taking place. According to estimations, the integration in these directions is not so intensive as the westward integration but is also not so slow as the eastward one. On the average, the status of this process is ranging between "middle" and "slow".

One could ear-mark three groups among Ukrainian political elite which are adherents of integration in this or that direction. Thus, during the year the "Russia-oriented politicians" (mentioned by 70-88% of experts, in June 67%) and the "leftists in the Supreme Rada" (51-61%, in June 70%) kept the leadership among those striving for integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state. Other, less important groups consist of "industrialists from Ukrainian-Russian groups (31-37%, in September 54%), and "socially deprived people" (34-39%, in June 22%). The share of the former increased significantly in September and decreased in December. According to the experts, the groups of "leaders of the MIC oriented towards cooperation with Russia" (24-36%), "regional leaders of Eastern and Southern Ukraine" (31-35%, in December 19%), "officers of the Armed Forces" (2-10%) also belong to adherents of this direction. Other groups are not significant (2-7%).

Among the main adherents of another direction of integration with the West, up to joining NATO, the experts first of all mention the "right-wing deputies of the Supreme Rada". Since March this group had been mentioned by 82-87% of experts, only in December by 68.3%, that by no means influenced its first position. In experts' opinion, the second group concerned consists of the "leaders of financial business". In March they were mentioned by 66.7% of experts, but in June by two times less 33.3%. Despite this fact, this group kept the second position during the year mentioned by 47.5% of experts in September, 56.1% in December. Other, less important groups, according to the experts, consist of the "centrists in the Supreme Rada" (mentioned by 30% to 40.5% of experts, permanently occupying the third position) and "middle-level businessmen" (from 26% to 35% of experts, keeping the fourth position). The "leaders of the Ministry of Defense" are also mentioned among the adherents of integration with the West, up to joining NATO (in March 16.7%, since June 28-24%). An ambiguous opinion is expressed by the experts as for "arms producers": in March and September this group was almost insignificant (4.8% and 2.5% accordingly), while in June and December its weight increased a little (10.3 and 14.6% accordingly). The same way, the group of "MIC leaders" was mentioned by 4-5% of experts from March till September, but in December by 17.1%. According to expert estimation (5-7%), "the officers of the Armed Forces" are not very concerned about integration with the West, as well as the "leaders of military educational institutions" (2-5%). The situation has not almost altered since September, except an insignificant decrease of the role of the former groups and increase of the role of the latter ones, that had no essential influence upon their ranking.

The expert estimations of Ukraine's foreign policy as a whole from the point of view of its stability, deliberatedness and predictability essentially increased compared with March. However after that they almost did not alter, except the index of "deliberatedness" which received a more negative estimation in September than in June and increased again in December. As a whole, by the end of the year estimations at all the three indices almost coincided (the estimation of predictability a little lower) and were very close to the "middle" level, while in March they were close to the "low" one.

Estimation of Bilateral Relations with Foreign States and Alignments
The experts are unanimous in respect of the countries relations with which should be developed at the first place. These are Russia, the USA, Germany, and Poland. In March and June their order remained like this, in September Germany and Russia followed the USA, while in December the USA were followed by Russia and Germany. Poland was always at the 4^th position. It is necessary to note that certain shifts in placement of the first three countries is of a conditional character, because the percentage difference between them in little and statistically insignificant. Besides these countries, the experts pointed out the priority of developing relations with Belarus (in March and June) and with Canada (in September and December).

On the other hand, according to most experts, Ukraine's relations with these very countries were developed most intensively. Such a situation was emphasized during the year as for all the mentioned countries, except Russia and Belarus. In March the experts put Russia on the first place (in June on the second) among the countries developing relations with which would be most desirable for Ukraine, but at the same time it was the last among the 24 mentioned countries with which Ukraine's relations were successfully and intensively developed.

An intricate attitude of Ukrainian foreign-policy circles towards Russia is caused by the absence of any euphoria of the fact of signing a number of important documents in May 1997. The course of relations at the state and governmental levels causes a careful and to a certain extent skeptic attitude of the experts to the prospects of Ukrainian-Russian relations.

In this regard, noteworthy is the realization of extreme importance of relations with Russia on one hand and understanding the imbalanced character of the achieved settlement of controversial matters, which at any moment can change to a new outburst of hatred, on the other hand. Among the experts, as well as among the politicians (with the exception of the left ones), two main orientation groups are predominating: the adherents of gradual normalization of bilateral relations and skeptics which deem establishment of normal, equal and mutually profitable relations with Russia almost impossible.

Belarus was never mentioned as a country with which bilateral relations were successfully developed. According to expert estimations, in March most successful was development of relations with the USA, Poland, Germany, Italy and Georgia; in June with Poland, Russia, the USA, Romania, Germany, Hungary and Moldova; in September with Poland, the USA, Russia, Germany, Canada, Georgia, Israel and Romania; in December with the USA, Poland, Russia, Canada, Germany, Georgia, the Netherlands and Korea. The share of other countries at these indices was insignificant.

Thus, Poland was absolute leader among the countries according to estimation of intensity and successfulness of relations in June and September. The estimation of bilateral relations with it was highest compared with other countries during the year, except March. One could say that the general rating of Poland began to increase since June. In September it was in its peak and in December turned back, almost to the beginning, March level. Thus, in June the evaluation of bilateral relations with this country increased from 3.90 to 4.13, in September to 4.27, in December it decreased to 4.10 points. On the other hand, in March and June it occupied the 2^nd place (52-53% of experts) among the countries relations with which were successfully and intensively developed, while in June and September it was put on the 1^st place in this respect (61% and 73% of experts accordingly).

A similar situation is observed at estimating it as an ally as a whole and as a country Ukraine could rely on in the process of reformation of the Armed Forces: in March and December it was mentioned as an ally by 43.9-48.8% of experts (2^nd position) and by 26.8% (4^th and 3^rd positions) of experts as a country Ukraine should cooperate with in reformation of the Armed Forces; in June 50% (2^nd) and 41% (2^nd) of experts accordingly; in September 63.4% (1^st) and 40% (2^nd) of experts accordingly. Until the latest times, the experts kept granting high estimation to the activities of Ukrainian diplomats at international arena in relations with Poland, but its was not the highest one as a general: in March 3.31 points (1^st); in June and September 4.03-3.95 (1^st); in December 3.90 (2^nd).

As for Canada with which Ukraine had best bilateral relations in March 4.13 points according to 5-point scale (1^st position), in June it lost its rating of a priority partner 3.80 points (5^th) and began to regain them from September 4.07 (3^rd). In December it almost managed to do it 4.07 (2^nd after Poland). Is was not surprising because in December it shared with Russia the 3^rd place (25%) after the USA and Poland among the countries relations with which had been lately successfully and intensively developed. In September Canada was at the 4^th position (18%), in June 9^th (7%), in March 6^th (17%).

According to a direct estimation, Ukraine's relations with Poland are the best, while by other indices the USA are absolute leader, especially in March and December. According to estimation of bilateral relations, in December, 1997 the USA occupied only the 3^rd place 3.83-4.05 points (in September the 4^th place). As for the estimation of successfulness of real actions of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with the USA, it especially increased in June and September (3.50-3.60 points) and was a little lower in March and December (3.10-3.29 points). This country was 2^nd in March, 3^rd in June, 5^th in September and 4^th in December. However, as mentioned before, in March and December the USA were first among the countries relations with which were most intensively developed (58-61% of experts) and by the end of the year became first among the countries developing relations with which was the priority of Ukraine's foreign policy (80-90% of experts in September and December). This coincides with the data that 41-63% of the experts regarded the USA as the first-rate ally of Ukraine, especially in respect of reformation of the Armed Forces (51-63%). It was only September when Poland arrested greater attention as an ally (43-50%, in September 64%), in other cases it followed the USA.

Despite the shifts in ranging, the first five countries having the highest estimation of bilateral relations with Ukraine remained unchanged during the year. Besides Poland, Canada and the USA it comprises the Baltic countries (3.80-4.23 points) and Georgia (3.79-4.05 points). The Baltic countries had a high estimation of bilateral relations with Ukraine compared with other countries in June and September (the 2^nd place), the Ukrainian diplomacy activities in this direction having been also highly estimated in September (3^rd place after Poland and the UN) 3.68 points. Besides, the Baltic states were mentioned as an important ally after the USA and Poland (29-44% of experts during the year), especially in September (37%) and December (44%), except June (21.1%).

The 6^th place, almost without distance from the last country, is occupied by Germany (3.95-3.85 points), in March and June the 8^th (3.63-3.55 points). According to the expert estimation, the Ukrainian diplomacy acted in this direction more successfully since the beginning of the year. As a whole, the experts do not estimate Germany too highly as an ally, though higher than in the beginning of the year (from 19.5% in March to 26.8% in December). Especially this country is regarded as one Ukraine could rely on during the reformation of its Armed Forces.

The following places are occupied by the countries which, according to expert estimations are able to move forward periodically, depending on the latest events. Thus, the 6-13^th places were occupied by:

in March: Israel, Hungary, Germany, Slovakia, Italy, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Kazakhstan 3.79-3.47 points;
in June: Moldova, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Israel, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Kazakhstan 3.69-3.33 points;
in September: Germany, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Israel, Great Britain, the Republic of Korea 3.95-3.59 points;
in December: Germany, the Czech Republic, the Benelux countries, Hungary, Finland, Israel, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Korea 3.95-3.40 points.

The last positions are occupied by such countries as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf countries 28-31 places (2.91-3.07 points); France 30-34 places, only in December the 24^th place; Latin America countries 31-36 places (2.59-2.97); Belarus 33-36 places, only in June 17^th (2.50-3.18 points); Romania 31-35 places, only in June 16^th (2.14-3.23); the Asian and Pacific Ocean region countries 34-36 places (2.68-2.85 points); Russia 35-36 places, only in June 25^th (1.56-3.06 points).

Thus, according to the expert estimation, relations between Ukraine and Russia are the worst ones, though in March and June Russia occupied the first place among the four countries developing relations with which was the priority of Ukraine's foreign policy; in September it was the 3^rd after the USA and Germany, in December the 2^nd after the USA. However, on the other hand, relations with it had been comparatively intensively developed since June: in June it was on 2^nd place according to this index (52%), in September (35%) and in December (25%) it shared the 3^rd place with Canada after Poland and the USA, though in March experts stressed that it was the last at this position (2%). Besides, today the estimation of the successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with Russia (2.74 points in December) is more high than in September (2.39 points) and in March (2.07 points), though a little lower than in June.

Certain differences in expert estimations were, surely, caused by a number of agreements signed between Ukraine and Russia in the end of May. Alluding to these events, in June the experts were suggested to estimate the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 31 May 1997 and the agreements concerning the problems of dividing the Black Sea Fleet: the extent of their correspondence to Ukraine's national interest. According to the results of the poll, their average estimation ranged between "middle" and "low". Among the main defects of the Treaty on cooperation signed by L.Kuchma and B.Yeltsin the experts mentioned 1) declarative character (41.5%) and 2) submission of Ukraine's strategic interests to Russia (29.3%). 53.7% of experts stressed the little extent of its effect on positive changes in bilateral relations, 19.5% deemed the extent of this effect "nought", 22% "middle" and only 4.9% regarded it as "high".

Among the main defects of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, most experts emphasized: 1) preserving the dislocation of foreign military force in the territory of Ukraine (63.4%), 2) preservation of potential threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (36.6%), 3) non-correspondence to the orientation of Ukraine at integration into European security structures (26.8%). 36.6% of the experts noted that these agreements corresponded to Ukraine's national interest to a "middle" extent, 36.6% of them deemed it "low", 18.4% "nought" and only 7.9% "high". In December most experts (62.5%) stressed the positive character of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 31 May 1997. On the other hand, according to the expert estimations, the rating of Russia and the CIS countries as Ukraine's allies decreased almost by two times compared with March (24% and 22% accordingly), making in December 12%. However at the same time Russia was constantly mentioned after the USA, Poland and Germany as a country Ukraine could rely on in reformation of its Armed Forces, though this opinion was more rare than in March (15-22%, compared with 37% in March).

Estimating the efforts of career diplomats in the sphere of realization of Ukraine's national interests, the experts ear-marked four most successful directions of cooperation. These are relations with Poland, the UN, NATO and the USA. According to the criterion of successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy, the mentioned countries and international organizations received, at a 5-point scale, the following marks: 3.10-2.95 in March; 4.03-3.50 in June; 3.95-3.46 in September (3.29 for the USA); 4.10-3.60 in December. Besides, a high evaluation was given to the successfulness and effectiveness of relations with the Baltic states and Germany, compared with other states, especially in March and September: accordingly 2.95 and 2.93 in March; 3.28 and 3.23 in June; 3.68 and 3.24 in September; 3.45 and 3.50 in December. The least effective directions, which had been estimated by the experts under "3" during the year, were relations with the Northern European countries (from 2,60 points in March to 2.93 in the end of the year), the Middle East and Persian Gulf countries (from 2.56 to 2.73 points in March-September and 2.61 in December), the Asian and Pacific region countries (2.30-2.63 points), the Central and South America countries (2.41 in March; from 2.13 in June to 2.56 in the end of the year), relations with Russia (2.07-2.74 points, except June 3.13). It is necessary to notify that since June, against the background of flights and falls of other countries' ratings, a gradual growth of the general rating of Ukrainian diplomacy's effectiveness at these directions was observed.

As for relations with the CIS as a whole, European structures (EU, etc.) and international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD), in June a noticeable growth of positive estimation of Ukrainian diplomats' activities at these directions, compared with March, was observed. The situation grew worse in September improved a little in December. The expert estimations of Ukrainian diplomats' activities at these directions were less than "3" points in March and September and essentially grew in June and December exceeding "3". Such a curve, though with other figures, could be seen at several directions, in particular in relations with Russia, the USA, NATO and the UN.

The growth of positive impression of governmental diplomacy in relations with international financial institutions seemed most paradoxical, specially taking into account the actual crisis in relations between the Government of Ukraine and the IMF during 1997. First of all it concerned the stoppage of crediting under Stand-by program after the Supreme Rada failed to adopt timely the budget for 1997. Secondly, the refusal of the IMF directors board to grant Ukraine financial assistance under EFF program. Thirdly, an actual blocking of loans under Stand-by in the second half of 1997 due to non-fulfillment by Ukraine of obligations concerning economic liberalization and entrepreneurship deregulation set forth in the Memorandum on Cooperation between the Government of Ukraine and the IMF.

In turn, the effectiveness of the Supreme Rada's Committee for Foreign Affairs and Ties with the CIS was rather estimated as "low", as well as the activities of the Parliamentary Committee for Defense and State Security. At the same time, it is necessary to note that though activities of the two Committees had no essential public response, it was the parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and Ties with CIS which had to defend Ukraine's interests in Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of European in respect of abolition of capital punishment. This issue was, in particular, accomplished with incorrectness or even absence of any correct and true information from the executive power bodies concerning the real situation of exercising death sentences in Ukraine. As a result, a danger of stoppage of Ukraine's participation in the activities of PA CE and other agencies of the Council of Europe.

The Status and Desirable Directions of Cooperation Between Ukraine and NATO
The results of the expert polls testify to the presence of a firm pro-NATO orientation among the Ukrainian experts (political establishment). Practically, the situation has not changed during 1997 besides a lot of events in the sphere. Since March the adherents of "Ukraine's joining NATO independently from other countries" constitute about one half of the experts with insignificant variations (between 46.3% and 51.2%). According to the latest data, in September and December their quantity was a little more than in March and June. If one also takes into account the adherents of "joining NATO together with the CIS countries" which make 5-7%, he could say that the orientation at joining NATO, as a general, dominates among the experts (54.7% in March; 35.4% in June; 55.2% in September; 58.5% in December).

As a whole, according to the experts, the rates of the process of Ukraine's westward integration NATO, EU, etc. gradually decreased from March till the latest times. In December the mentioned process began to increase, and the level of its intensity is now more close to "middle" than to "low".

In turn, a similar situation is observed in respect of the estimation of the successfulness of Ukrainian diplomacy in realization of Ukraine's national interest at international arena in relations with NATO. After a considerable increase of average score at this direction in June from 2.95 to 3.60 points according to 5-point scale (as a whole, an increase of estimations at all directions was registered in June), in September the estimation began to decrease 3.46 points, while in December it increased again reaching 3.71 points. Compared with other directions, in relations with NATO Ukrainian diplomacy receives a high estimation, the highest in June after Poland; in March after Poland and the USA; in September after Poland, the UN and the Baltic countries; in December after the UN and Poland.

These results coincide with the estimation of NATO as an ally Ukraine can rely on. Increasing in June by two times (47.4% of experts, compared with 24.4% in March), the estimation decreases by two times in September (26.8%) and increases again in December (34.1%). In general, during the year NATO occupied the 4^th position among the countries and international alignments mentioned by the experts as Ukraine's allies after the USA, Poland and the Baltic states.

The fact that nobody of the experts in December said that "cooperation with NATO is not necessary at all" testifies to the improvement of relations with NATO. Only 10-12% of the experts expressed such an opinion before.

The reasons for the improvement of experts' attitude to NATO and the whole complex of relations between Ukraine and the Alliance consisted first of all in launching the phase of practical cooperation in autumn 1997, and in activities of NATO's Information Centre in Ukraine in the sphere of public relations. We could also stress the role of the determinant of international and European security which reflected first of all in a rather noticeable influence on the settlement and harmonization of interstate relations in Central-Eastern Europe. It is difficult to forecast the further role of this factor for sure, but at the initial, preparatory stage of NATO's eastward enlargement which started after the Madrid summit in July, 1997 the Alliance is obviously playing an essential stabilizing role which objectively corresponds to Ukraine's national interest.

The first sitting of joint Commission Ukraine-NATO at the level of ministers for foreign affairs took place in Brussels on January 16, 1998. The Commission examined the status of implementation of the Charter and approved the Working Plan for Implementation of the Charter on Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and the North-Atlantic Alliance for 1998. The official purpose of the Commission consists in implementation of the Charter on Distinctive Partnership signed in Madrid on July 9, 1997. Secretary-General of NATO Javier Solana expressed his hope that the Charter on Distinctive Partnership would be implemented by the end of 1998.

The Commission will work at the issues of cooperation in the sphere of European security, military cooperation, common peace-making operations, nuclear disarmament, coordination of military doctrines of Ukraine and NATO, conducting common seminars on military and economic security of Ukraine. At the sitting of the Commission, the Ukrainian minister for emergency and protection of population from the consequences of Chernobyl disaster Valeriy Kalchenko and Secretary-General of NATO J.Solana signed the Memorandum on Understanding in the Sphere of Planning in Civil emergency and Readiness to Disasters between the Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine and NATO.

Besides, whereas the Treaty on Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the European Union of 1997 did not come into effect, the Charter signed with NATO became the first document which registered Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic affiliation.

During the year the experts outlined the priority directions of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO as "granting Ukraine extra guarantees of security" from NATO and "creation of preconditions for Ukraine's joining NATO in future". The importance of these directions gradually decreased: from 57.1% of experts in March to 41.5% in December, as for the first one, and from 54.8% to 39% of experts, as for the second one. But this did not prevent them from being the most important directions.

The experts did not estimate highly the capability of the Charter on Distinctive Cooperation between Ukraine and NATO signed in Madrid on July 9, 1997 of providing the national interest of Ukraine. 51.3% of experts determined its quality in performing this function as "middle", while 33.3% as "low". Only 5.1% of experts deem it "high", against 10.3% "nought". Among the main flaws of it, first of all, are "the absence of effective guarantees to Ukraine from NATO" 58.5%, and "the absence of guarantees of Ukraine's integration into European security structures" 39%, were mentioned.

Such a direction of cooperation as "direct assistance in implementation of military reform" occupied the 3^rd position in March and June and the 4^th in September and December. Generally, it is mentioned by 30-35% of experts. The next direction which concerns "coordination of policies in view of NATO's eastward enlargement" lost its rating in December, to a certain extent, due to making clear the circumstances of the first phase of NATO's enlargement. This reflected the way of realization of the decision on NATO's enlargement without any practical steps concerning the 2^nd and 3^rd-rank candidates to join NATO. Until that time, this problem arrested the greatest attention and concern grew from 28.6% in March to 37.5% in September and occupied the 4^th position, in September even the 3^rd one. Against the background of a general increase of the rating of NATO as a friendly organization, in December this direction ("adjustment of the political course in connection with NATO's eastward enlargement") was mentioned only by 19.5% of the experts, and now it shares 8-10^th places with such directions of cooperation as "adjustment of military-technical policy and support of the MIC" and "staff training". Instead of this, such a direction of cooperation as "arms, specialized technics and services of military purpose", which was put at the last positions before and acquired popularity during the year, occupied the 3^rd place. In March it was stressed by 11.9% of experts, in June by 15%, in September by 22.5%, in December by 36.6% of experts (this means the 10^th, 9^th, 7^th and 3^rd places accordingly).

The positions of the direction of "joint development of conceptual grounds of policy with NATO" almost did not alter, it gathered 25-29% and occupied 5-6^th places. The same was the position of "participation in peace-making operations" in September and December (27.5-29.3%), which raised from the 6-8^th place (16.7%) in March and the 8^th (15%) in June. The expert estimation of the priority of "joint exercises" was a little higher than in previous polls 22.0%, that means the 7^th position. In March this direction was mentioned by 16.7% (6-8^th place), in June 7.5% (11^th place), in September 15% (9^th place). As mentioned before, in December such directions of cooperation as "coordination of military-technical policies and maintenance of the MIC" and staff training" shared with "coordination of foreign policy in view of NATO's eastward enlargement" the 8-10^th places (19.5%). It is not unexpected, because during the process of implementation of this decision there were practically ignored interests of 2-3 stage candidates to join NATO. "Coordination of military-technical policies and maintenance of the MIC" was mentioned by 14-22% of experts, while "staff training" by 16-19%, that means the last and next to last positions.

Certainly, the experts' opinion was essentially influenced by signing the Charter on Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO which took place in Madrid on July 9, 1997. In June the experts were suggested to characterize the future document on cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. First of all, the experts would like this document to be a legally binding treaty with clear obligations and rights of the parties (57%). Only 9.5% of experts considered that this document was not necessary at all. The same percentage of experts said that it was going to be a political declaration not subject to ratification by the Supreme Rada. 14.5% of experts stated that it had to be the same document as that between NATO and Russia. At last, 9.5% failed to clarify their attitude to the contents of the future document. Among the provisions which, according to most experts should be included to the text of the document, the following ones were mentioned:

participation of Ukraine in NATO decision-making process when it deals with interests of Ukraine (78.9% of experts);
prohibition to install nuclear weapon in the territories of new NATO members (53.3% of experts);
redrafting the Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe taking into account Ukraine's interests (the issues of flank restrictions etc.) 47.4% of experts.

As mentioned above, after signing the Charter, in September, the experts estimated the extent to which it is able to provide the national interest of Ukraine. As a whole, the estimation ranges between "middle" (51.3%) and "low" (33.3%). Among the main flaws mentioned by the experts there were, first of all, "lack of efficient NATO guarantees on the security of Ukraine" 58.5%, "lack of guarantees for Ukraine's integration into European security structures" 39.0% and "declarative character" 34.1%.

However, in December the experts rather highly estimated the "positive character" of the Charter on Distinctive Partnership between Ukraine and NATO: it was stressed by 55% of experts (the 2^nd rank among the most important international gains of Ukraine of 1997!).

Expert Estimation of Domestic Determinants of National Security Policy
Since March the experts gave a little higher estimation to the current level of confidence in and influence of the elite leaders on heads of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies. In December the general level of confidence of elite leaders in heads of the mentioned structures ranged between "middle" and "low", while in March it was more close to "low". According to expert estimations, since March the level of influence of elite leaders on the structures in charge of foreign policy was a bit higher than that on the structures in charge of Ukraine's defense policy. However despite the fact that since March the evaluation indices grew better (with certain lowering in September), by December this difference remained unchanged. According to summing-up data, the general level of influence of elite leaders on heads of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policy could be evaluated as one close to "middle", while in the case of foreign-policy structures as one equal to "middle", while in March it was close to "low".

The level of the military's support of the state leadership policy also had been growing since March, but the growth was not significant. However in December it ranged between "middle" and "low" (in March it was generally "low").

One could assume that the estimations connected with the status of the Armed Forces and the level of confidence in governmental officials in charge of military sphere and military policy are of an imbalanced and subjective character. It can be explained by both the difficult problems of the Armed Forces as a whole and the vagueness of the prospects of reformation of the army. Thus, during 1991-1997 the Ukrainian Armed Forces were reduced by 400000 persons, including 70 thousand cadre servicemen. This reduction goes on in 1998 during which 17000 of cadre servicemen are subject to reduction.

At the same time, the difficult situation of the army can be also explained by the lack of financing the Armed Forces during the latest years. At the first time for the latest years, the Law "On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1998" provides for increase of allotments to national defense by more than HR200 million to the level of HR1678269000. In 1998 they will make 6.855% of budget allotments.

As for divergences between regions (the attitude of regional elites to the state leadership's policy, the level of divergences in situation of different regions of the country and peculiarities of their general attitude to governmental policies), the experts' answers were ambiguous, but the opinion that these aspects remain unchanged was overwhelming in June and December 36.6% of experts adhered to this standpoint. In turn, 29-24% of those polled considered that the regional divergences were "leveling", 27-19% regarding them as ones "deepening". In March and September 45% and 56% of the questioned considered that regional divergences remained unchanged, 19-14% thought that they were "leveling" and 29-19% regarded them as "deepening".